Residential property loans and performance during property price booms: evidence from European by Martins, António et al.
1 
 
 
 
Residential Property Loans and Bank 
Performance during Property Price Booms: 
Evidence from Europe 
 
António Miguel Martins 
CIICESI, Escola Superior de Tecnologia e Gestão de Felgueiras,  
Instituto Politécnico do Porto 
amm@estgf.ipp.pt 
 
Ana Paula Serra* 
CEF.UP and Universidade do Porto 
aserra@fep.up.pt 
 
Francisco Vitorino Martins 
FEP, Universidade do Porto 
vmartins@fep.up.pt 
 
Simon Stevenson 
Henley Business School, University of Reading 
s.a.stevenson@reading.ac.uk 
 
*Corresponding author 
Address:  Rua Dr. Roberto Frias s/n  
4200-464 Porto 
Portugal 
+351 225571100 
+351 225505050 
 
  
2 
 
Residential Property Loans and Bank 
Performance during Property Price Booms: 
Evidence from Europe 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Understanding the performance of banks is of the utmost importance due to the 
impact the sector may have on economic growth and financial stability. Residential 
mortgage loans constitute a large proportion of the portfolio of many banks and are one of 
the key assets in the determination of performance. Using a dynamic panel model, we 
analyse the impact of residential mortgage loans on bank profitability and risk, based on a 
sample of 555 banks in the European Union (EU-15), over the period from 1995 to 2008. 
We find that banks with larger weights in residential mortgage loans display lower 
credit risk in good market conditions. This result may explain why banks rush to lend on 
property during booms due to the positive effect it has on credit risk. The results also show 
that credit risk and profitability are lower during the upturn in the residential property 
cycle. Furthermore, the results reveal the existence of a non-linear relationship (U-shaped 
marginal effect), as a function of bank’s risk, between profitability and residential mortgage 
exposure. For those banks that have higher credit risk, a large exposure to residential loans 
is associated with increased risk-adjusted profitability, through a reduction in risk. For 
banks with a moderate to low credit risk, the impact of higher exposure are also positive on 
risk-adjusted profitability.  
 
 
Keywords: Residential Property Prices; Mortgage Loans; Bank Performance; 
Dynamic Panel Estimation 
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Residential Property Loans and Bank 
Performance during Property Price Booms: 
Evidence from Europe 
 
1. Introduction 
The recent turmoil in the world’s financial system, which began in the US mortgage 
market, illustrated the very close relationship between property price changes and the 
health of the financial sector. Slumps in the property market tend to follow and exacerbate, 
or spur banking crises1, as demonstrated by Allen and Gale (2000) and proven by several 
historical crises2, the most recent example of which is the US subprime crisis.  
There is almost universal agreement that the fundamental cause of the subprime 
crisis was the combination of credit boom and housing bubble. Pezzuto (2008) refers to 
the low interest rates, high level of leverage, “credit euphoria” of both lenders and 
borrowers and a more aggressive short-term orientation, as the combined factors which 
strongly contributed to the subprime crisis. Acharya et al. (2011) note that when the 
“bubble” burst, a severe economic crisis was bound to come. These events resulted in a 
collapse of the banking industry3, stock market crashes, a large decrease in liquidity on the 
credit market, economic recession and have contributed in a major way to the subsequent 
sovereign credit crisis. Moreover, this crisis affected real economies as well as financial 
markets, resulting, for example, in drops in productivity growth, increases in 
unemployment, and a decrease in international trade. Horta et al. (2008) and Hwang et al. 
(2010) examined the contagion effects of US subprime crisis on international stock 
markets. Hwang et al. (2010) found evidence of financial contagion during the crisis in both 
emerging and developed (in this case European) markets. Horta et al. (2008) using copula 
models found that Canada, Japan, Italy, France and UK all display significant levels of 
contagion.  For other two countries analyzed (Germany and Portugal) the null hypothesis 
of absence of contagion could not be rejected. Finally, Verick and Islam (2010) find that 
the Baltic States, Ireland and Spain were the European Countries that suffered the most 
                                                 
1 Herring and Wachter (1999) state that “Real Estate Cycles may occur without banking crises and banking crises may 
occur without real estate cycles. But the two phenomena are correlated in remarkable number of instances ranging over a wide 
variety of institutional arrangements, in both advanced industrial nations and emerging economies”. 
2 For example, in the US and Scandinavia (late 80s), in Mexico and Japan (early 90s) and in Southeast Asia 
(1998). Please refer to Hilbers et al., 2001. 
3 The list of banks that have been affected by the 2007-2012 global financial crisis can be seen in 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_bankrupt_or_acquired_banks_during_the_subprime_mortgage_crisis 
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severe labour market impact and economic contraction as a result of the subprime crisis. In 
contrast, Germany and Austria were the least affected.  
Of all the different assets that comprise banks’ portfolios, real estate related ones 
are particularly important for two particular reasons. Firstly, mortgage loans represent one 
of its largest asset categories. Within the EU-15 for the period from 2001 to 2008, the 
weight of residential property loans in total loans varied from a maximum value of 33% in 
2003 to a minimum of 21% in 2008 (ECB, 2005 and 2010). Secondly, the banks’ exposure 
to the real estate sector is even larger owing to the widespread use of these assets as 
collateral for other types of loans. 
Herring and Wachter (1999) argue that during an upswing of real estate prices, 
banks have a tendency to underestimate the default risk of loans directly or indirectly 
related to real estate. The existence of moral hazard and disaster myopia, caused by high 
competition and an emphasis on size growth, following the liberalisation of the banking 
sector and by the loss of institutional memory regarding the possibility of property prices 
collapse, tends to lead to banks taking excessive risks whereas the risk premium may be 
insufficient to cover potential losses4. Jimenez et al. (2006) state that during booms riskier 
borrowers obtain credit and collateral requirements decreases. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) also 
found evidence of a decrease in lending standards associated with substantial increases in 
the number of loan applications. The authors show that lending standards declined to a 
greater extent in areas that experienced faster credit growth. They also note that the entry 
of new lenders contributed to the decline in lending standards. With specific reference to 
the subprime experience in the US, Demyanyk and van Hemert (2011) report that loan 
quality consistently declined for the six years prior to the crisis in 2007. As they note, the 
high level of house price appreciation observed in the US during this period contribution 
to this decline in loan quality being either noticed or fully appreciated in terms of its 
implications5.  
                                                 
4 The Economist, 2003, reveals that the “six countries where houses appear to be overvalued (America, Britain, 
Australia, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain) also share another bubble-like symptom: an explosion in mortgage borrowing in 
recent years. ... In the Netherlands the average new mortgage there is 110% of the value of a home, because lenders are happy to 
finance all the purchasing costs, including stamp duty and fees. ... This means that if prices were to drop, more households would 
be left with debts exceeding the value of their home than were a decade ago.” 
5 For specific work on default and foreclosures in the US subprime market in recent years see papers such as 
Gerardi et al. (2007) and Dalglish (2009).  
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Gentle et al. (1994) examine the extent of “negative equity”6 in the United Kingdom 
in the early 90s, noting that the “property owning democracy” led to, after the collapse of 
property prices, a “nation of debtors”. The phenomenon of negative equity has also been 
observed by White (2010a, 2010b), who states that in the US, the collapse of property 
prices resulted in an increasing number of defaults, since the property market prices fell 
below the original mortgage advance used to buy the property7.  
Despite extensive literature on the relationship between bank loans and real estate 
prices at a macroeconomic level, few studies have been undertaken on the impact of real 
estate prices on bank profitability and credit risk. Davis and Zhu (2009) argue specifically 
that most studies fail to highlight the role that real estate may play in the performance of 
the banking sector. Furthermore results may be biased given that most studies separately 
examine the factors that determine either bank profitability or risk. 
Studies on bank profitability (see, for example, Maudos and Guevara, 2004 and 
Valverde and Fernández, 2007) or bank credit risk (see, for example, Salas and Saurina, 
2002), examine the role of macroeconomic factors (such as GDP growth and level of 
indebtedness) or microeconomic factors (such as market competition conditions, interest 
rate risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, default risk and operating costs), but ignore, or 
inadequately consider, the specific risks associated with banks’ real estate loan portfolio (see 
Salas and Saurina, 2002)8. One of the exceptions in the literature is the study by Davis and 
Zhu (2009) which analyses the effect of commercial property price changes on the risk and 
profitability of a group of banks from industrialised economies. The authors find that 
performance of banks and bank loans are strongly correlated with asset price changes, and 
particularly with real estate asset prices, owing to banks’ large direct and indirect exposure 
to the real estate sector.  
The present study differs from the study undertaken by Davis and Zhu (2009) on 
three key points. Firstly, it differs with regard to the category of real estate assets analysed. 
We analyse the importance of the exposure to residential mortgage loans and changes in 
real estate prices on bank risk and return, instead of commercial real estate assets. Secondly, 
the sample of banks analysed relates to the EU-15 markets whilst Davis and Zhu (2009) 
analyse a sample of 904 banks from several industrialised counties (including 8 EU-15 
                                                 
6 This refers to the situation whereby the market value of the property on the mortgage completion date is 
lower than the value of the capital owing to the bank. 
7 The author calls this decision “strategic default”. 
8 Salas and Saurina (2002) state that “within the loan category there are different levels of risk, with the riskiest loans being 
those to the real estate and construction sectors, followed by commercial and industrial loans and, finally, household mortgage”. 
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countries). Thirdly, we propose a model of bank profitability vis a vis bank exposure to 
residential mortgage loans that takes into account the level of bank credit risk. 
We use dynamic panel data methods to estimate the influence of residential 
mortgage loans on bank profitability and risk, using a sample of 555 banks in the EU-15, 
over the period from 1995 to 2008. The results suggest that a higher exposure to residential 
mortgage loans on the balance sheet is associated with lower credit risk for banks in good 
times. The results obtained further show a reduction in both credit risk and profitability for 
banks during the upturn in the price cycle pertaining to the residential property sector. We 
also observe a non-linear relationship (U-shaped marginal effect), function of bank’s risk, 
between profitability and the balance-sheet exposure to residential mortgage loans. For 
those banks that have high credit risk, higher exposure to residential mortgage loans results 
in higher risk-adjusted profitability, since residential mortgage loans facilitate lower credit 
risk. For banks with a moderate/low credit risk, the effects of higher exposure to 
residential mortgage loans on profitability are also positive, at least marginally so.  
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we briefly characterise the 
European residential mortgage markets and provide a brief review of the factors 
determining bank profitability and credit risk, with a special emphasis on those pertaining 
to the real estate market. In section 3 we present the research questions and the 
specification of the empirical models proposed. Section 4 sets out the results of the 
empirical analysis. Conclusions are presented in Section 5.  
 
2. Determinants of Bank Profitability and Credit Risk  
2.1. The European Residential Mortgage Markets  
Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) state that there are significant differences between the EU 
countries with regard to the characteristics of the mortgage market9. These institutional 
differences may aid in explaining the differences observed in the volatility of prices and 
influence differential banks’ risk-taking across countries. 
_____________________________ 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
                                  ______________________________ 
                                                 
9 Those aspects relate to several aspects such as the prevailing interest rate in the mortgage market; the 
possibility of Equity withdrawal; the level of LTV (Loan-to-Value) ratios; accepted property valuation 
methods and the availability of asset securitization. 
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In Europe, retail deposits are the main source of funding for residential mortgage 
loans, representing 2/3 of the residential mortgage loans. Mortgage bond issues are the 
second most important funding resource, after deposits. Data obtained from the European 
Mortgage Federation (EMF) show that in 2009, three countries accounted for an 88% 
share of the entire European mortgage bond market. In Germany “Hypotheken Pfandbriefe” 
represented 44% of all the mortgage bonds issued in the EU, followed by Denmark (29%) 
and Sweden (15%)10. 
Coles and Hardt (2000) highlight a number of institutional factors which help in 
explaining the relative small size of Mortgage Backed Securities’ (MBS) in Europe, in 
contrast to the situation in the USA11. These factors include the existence of other types of 
competitive funding resources on the balance sheet, which is the case with Mortgage-
Backed Bonds. With the mortgage bond, the originating institution keeps the assets on its 
balance sheet and assumes ultimate responsibility for the bonds’ credit risk, whilst with a 
MBS, the loan is sold and completely removed from the originating bank’s balance sheet12 
(Hardt, 2000). 
Therefore, it is difficult to measure the total exposure to residential mortgage loans for 
those banks which extensively perform securitisation operations, as these operations are 
not accounted for on the balance sheet. Nevertheless, as this form of funding is not 
commonly used in Europe, the effects on banks’ financial standing should be negligible. 
 
                                                 
10 Acharya et al. (2011) identify the existence of three major funding models for mortgage credit in developed 
economies. “The first one is the deposit-based system, where banks originate mortgages funded by deposits and hold the 
mortgages on their books. This “old model of banking” is still the dominant type of mortgage finance in most countries outside the 
US. The second type is the “new model of banking” where loans are no longer held on banks’ balance sheets, but are originated 
to distribute in the form of MBS. They document that the US had the largest securitization share (higher than 50% of all 
originations), while no other country exceeded 25%. Only Australia and Canada have sizable MBS markets. The third major 
form of mortgage finance is the “mortgage or covered bond”, popular in continental Europe, especially in Denmark, Germany and 
France. Covered bonds are issued by banks and share many features with MBS, but they also differ in important ways. Most 
importantly, investors in covered bonds have a general claim on the issuing bank; but in the event that the issuing bank defaults, 
the investor can claim the underlying mortgage collateral. This structure provides two layers of protection for the covered bond 
investor: the bank’s equity and the housing collateral.” 
11 Amongst the reasons that Coles and Hardt (2000) identified are: higher capital requirements; the existence 
of other competitive funding instruments on the balance sheet; the lack of permission for state guarantees; 
the lack of consistent statistics (hindering the valuation of securitised products); and legal complexity and lack 
of standardisation. 
12 As Hardt (2000) states on page 17 “In the case of mortgage bonds, the originating institution keeps the assets on its 
balance sheet and maintains ultimate responsibility for the credit risk of the bond. The mortgage loans and the bonds remain on 
the on the balance sheet of the originating mortgage credit institution. The use of MBS, by contrast, involves the sale of mortgage 
loans and their complete removal from balance sheet. The institution retains any excess interest from the loans over the all-in cost 
of the securitisation in the form of servicing commissions or other types of income, but removes the loans and any associated capital 
requirement or risk provision from the balance sheet”. 
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2.2. Bank Risk and Profitability and Real Estate Prices 
The review of the literature presented below looks into the relationship between property 
prices and bank risk and profitability. While some studies examine how property prices 
impact banks’ decisions, in a macroeconomic perspective, others evaluate the role of real 
estate exposures in bank’s profitability and risk. 
 
2.2.1. The Impact of Residential Property Prices on the Banking Sector: the Macroeconomic Perspective 
Several studies point out that there is a strong financial and economic relationship between 
real estate and credit cycles: decreased economic activity leads to a feedback cycle of falling 
asset prices, deteriorating balance sheets, tightening financing conditions and constrained 
external financing to fund profitable investment opportunities, and so forth.  The most 
influential argument refers to the “financial accelerator” mechanism proposed by Bernanke 
et al. (1994) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In their models credit market imperfections 
exist because borrowers have informational advantages over lenders regarding the true 
value of the underlying projects. To mitigate the potential problems of adverse selection 
and moral hazard, banks require clients to provide collateral assets. The price of bank loans 
(the risk premium) will depend upon the value and quality (in terms of liquidity, price 
volatility, etc.) of the collateral. The financial accelerator mechanism together with the fact 
that real estate assets are often used as collateral, explains why real estate price cycles tend 
to have a significant impact on the bank lending behaviour and on bank risk and 
profitability.  
Furthermore, there are potentially other channels through which real estate price 
cycles could affect bank lending behaviour and bank risk and profitability. On one hand, an 
increase in the price of real estate tends to increase the value of banks’ fixed assets (if the 
bank owns property) and boost bank capitalisation. On the other hand, the real estate 
sector may further affect the banking sector indirectly via, its overall economic impact. If 
property market fundamentals are sufficiently strong then developers will initiate new 
projects. This construction activity generates new demand for other sectors and thus tends 
to cause an expansion in the general economy and may stimulate general demand for bank 
credit. 
Although the theory and empirical evidence predicts that the increase in property 
prices leads to a rise loan approval, the impact of real estate prices on bank risk and 
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profitability is less obvious (Herring and Wachter, 1999). In an efficient market, the interest 
rate charged by a bank should reflect the true default risk for the underlying assets, and 
therefore, bank profitability should only depend on whether they are more or less risk-
averse. However, the profitability of the banking sector might not increase throughout a 
property cycle if the mortgage credit risk premium component stays low from the start of 
the cycle. This may result in banks changing their attitudes towards risk throughout the 
cycle or when there are distortions in the loan decision process (e.g. Jimenez et al. 2006 and 
Dell’Ariccia et al. 2008). Herring and Wachter (1999) argue that banks may underestimate 
the default risk on mortgages loans during strong property market conditions. Specifically, 
banks have a tendency to disregard the danger of adverse selection when they expand 
lending within a short space of time. This tendency towards “disaster myopia” can arise as 
a result of poor risk management or a changing tolerance for risk. Furthermore, this 
myopia can in part be attributable inter alia to inadequate data, measurement bias (Borio et 
al., 2001), pervasive incentives linked to the safety net, intensified competition following 
the liberalisation of the banking sector (e.g., Chan et al. 1986, Hellman et al. 2000 and 
Marquez 2002) or institutional memory loss over time regarding the possibility of property 
prices collapsing (Berger and Udell, 2004). 
Tversky and Kahneman (1982) state that decision-makers tend to formulate 
subjective probabilities on the basis of the “availability heuristic”, i.e., how easily decision-
makers can imagine that the event will occur. Since the ease with which an event can be 
imagined is highly correlated with the frequency that the event occurs, this rule of thumb 
provides a reasonably accurate estimate of high-frequency events. But the ease of recall is 
also affected by other factors such as the time elapsed since the last occurrence. Simon 
(1978) states that this tendency to underestimate the probability of such shocks is 
exacerbated by the “threshold heuristic”. When the subjective probability falls below some 
threshold amount (π* in figure 2) it is disregard and treated as if it were zero. 
_____________________________ 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
                                  ______________________________ 
Put together, these two factors tend to cause “disaster myopia”, in other words, the 
tendency, over time, to underestimate the probability of low-frequency shocks. Bank 
managers have a tendency to consider the existence of a positive probability of a collapse 
of property prices, albeit a limited one, since they are a priori unaware of such a probability 
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and do not have sufficient information to extrapolate it. During the upturn in the property 
price cycle, this subjective probability of a price collapse tends to decrease, leading banks to 
expand lending to a larger number of borrowers. Furthermore, borrowers deemed to be 
very risky during the previous stage of the cycle, tend to obtain loans more easily during the 
expansion phase. Consequently, the quality of the loans portfolios is likely to deteriorate 
and the portfolio of loans become much riskier during the maturity phase of the cycle13. A 
further element in this regard is that participants in residential property markets frequently 
display extrapolative or adaptive expectations (Case and Shiller, 1989, Poterba, 1991). This 
can contribute to the presence of myopic expectations in that participants may fail to 
account for potential reversals in price trends (Malpezzi and Wachter, 2005, Stevenson, 
2008). 
Once a shock occurs, disaster myopia tends to become disaster magnification. The 
availability heuristic may exacerbate financial conditions because, just after a shock (such as 
t+n’ in figure 2), it is easy for all agents to imagine another sharp decline in real estate prices 
and the subjective shock probability will rise well above the true shock probability. As 
Guttentag and Herring (1984) show, this will result in sharp increases in interest rates as 
banks try to reduce exposure and increase risk premiums in response to higher shock 
probabilities. The extent of credit rationing is likely to expand for borrowers who cannot 
offer a credible contractual rate that will compensate for the increase in the perceived risk 
of default. Regulators and supervisors also tend to suffer from disaster magnification, and 
in response to the greatly increased subjective probability of a disaster may seek to protect 
the banking system by insisting on higher capital ratios and more aggressive provisioning 
against potential losses. This phenomenon is further worsened by the fact that many banks 
delay provisioning for loan losses to the recession phases of the property price cycle, 
thereby leading the economic cycle to have a greater impact on bank capital and 
profitability (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003). The net result of this is that the disaster myopia 
phenomenon might lead to banks taking excessive risks, while the risk premium required 
may not be sufficient to compensate for potential losses.  
Another related issue is concerned with the diversification versus focus debate (e.g. 
Diamond 1984, Winton 1999, Stomper 2006). Financial intermediation theory suggests that 
banks should diversify to reduce risks or focus their lending on industries about which they 
                                                 
13
Hellman et al. (2000) express the view that Japanese financial-market liberalization in the 1990 increased 
competition and reduced the profitability and franchise value of domestic banks, which, jointly with others 
factors, lead to the East Asian financial crisis and a weaker financial system in Japan. 
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have superior expertise to increase risk-adjusted returns. Acharya et al. (2006) and Elyasiani 
and Deng (2004) provide empirical evidence that loan portfolio policy should not be driven 
by diversification but by a bank’s specific monitoring abilities in industries or sectors. Yet 
Guttentag and Herring (1985, 1986) state that the decision to concentrate credit in a given 
sector depends mostly, amongst other factors, on the increase in expected returns, on the 
decreased probability of default and on the expected value of the assets. 
 
2.2.2. Other Determinants of Bank Risk and Profitability 
Our goal here is to identify the risk and profitability determinants used in the previous 
studies to ensure that the results obtained for the variables associated with the real estate 
sector are not biased by omitted factors. 
 
2.2.2.1. Credit Risk 
Macroeconomic Factors 
The empirical evidence suggests that there is a close relationship between bank credit risk 
and the economic cycle. When economic growth is low or even negative, companies and 
households reduce their cash inflows (sales, wages), which in turn leads to increased default 
on payments to banks. In this paper we use the GDP growth rate to proxy economic 
activity as GDP is considered to be a more informative measurement than other 
macroeconomic variables, such as changes in unemployment, real wages and real interest 
rates (Salas and Saurina, 2002).  
Depending on the level of indebtedness of companies and households, changes in 
aggregate economic activity may have different effects on credit risk. Moreover, such 
effects may vary from country to country due to differences in the debt composition of 
households and companies (short versus long-term debt), and differences in the 
relationship between banks and companies. Davis (1992) finds that in countries such as the 
US, the UK, Canada and France, a rise in a company’s indebtedness increases the 
likelihood of bankruptcy. In contrast, in Japan the opposite effect is observed. Germany 
appears to be an intermediate case (non-significant relationship). In the Japanese financial 
system there is a close relationship between banks and companies which means that banks 
are highly informed about the financial situation of firms. Therefore, banks tend to be less 
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reluctant to finance companies during periods of economic recession, even if the 
companies’ debt ratio may be already high14.  
 
Microeconomic Factors 
Salas and Saurina (2002) argue that the three main microeconomic variables which could 
explain the banks’ risk decision-making are; the rate of credit growth, the composition of 
the loan portfolio and the incentives to take riskier credit policies.  
A rapid credit growth is considered to be one of the main causes of increased bank 
risk. Clair (1992) and Solttila and Vihriälä (1994), after controlling for the composition of 
banks’ loans portfolio, show evidence that past loan growth aids in explaining current levels 
of bad debt. Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) empirically demonstrate that banks with rapid 
credit expansion are riskier. Salas and Saurina (2002) state that banks that focus on 
increasing market share tend to register lower levels of quality required of their customers. 
Therefore, if another bank tries to steal its market share, a bank will probably try to keep its 
best customers and will let go its lowest-quality customers. Consequently, if credit 
expansion is made in a new geographical area or sector in which the bank has no earlier 
experience, it is more likely to be affected by problems of adverse selection.  
Credit monitoring is also another key element in ensuring a good credit policy. To 
this end, an effective risk analysis and internal control structure needs to be in place. The 
shortage and misuse of resources allocated to this task may affect the bank’s solvency. 
Berger and DeYoung (1997) find that decreases in costs efficiency are related to increases 
in bad debt. Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) further state that inefficient banks are more prone 
to risk taking.     
Another factor which may affect credit risk is portfolio composition. Different 
types of loans have different credit risks. The structure of the balance sheet, particularly the 
loan portfolio, reflects the credit risk accepted by managers. Pensala and Solttila (1993), 
Randall (1993), Murto (1994), Domowitz and Sartain (1999), amongst others, state that 
different credit categories have different levels of risk, and that the real estate and 
construction sectors come out on top as the riskiest sectors, followed by commercial and 
industrial loans, and finally, household mortgages. 
                                                 
14 Petersen and Rajan (1994) show that the existence of a close relationship between the bank and the 
company increases the availability of funds for the latter.  
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 Keeton and Morris (1988) consider whether the high level of bad debt of some 
banks is the result of a deliberately riskier credit policy, though anticipated by charging 
higher interest rates (a higher risk premium). The authors conclude that banks which 
charge highest interest rates are those which previously had higher levels of bad debt.  
The existence of incentives by managers to follow policies of taking high risks may 
be another factor determining bank credit risk. Banks with solvency problems can try to 
solve them by relying on a rapid credit expansion in sectors with high profitability but also 
with high risk. Contributing towards this situation is the fact that shareholders and 
managers have little to lose, given their limited liability and due to the fact that these banks 
have a low level of capital. A subtler case appears when bank margins decrease 
continuously. Managers can attempt to compensate for this slow but steady decrease by 
adopting riskier credit policies that could eventually lead to an increase in bad loans. 
 Petersen and Rajan (1995) find that a higher percentage of young companies are 
financed in a concentrated banking market rather than in a competitive one. According to 
the authors, if the bank has monopoly power, the possibility of charging the company 
higher interest rates in the future means that a bank can finance a higher number of lower 
quality customers, or that these customers could receive funds from the bank even in 
periods of financial distress. This situation will tend not to happen in competitive markets, 
where it is not possible to recover in the future the losses of the present as the company, 
after work through its problems, would not pay an interest rate above the market rate. 
 
2.2.2.2. Profitability 
Macroeconomic Factors 
Valverde and Fernández (2007) use real GDP when analysing the factors determining the 
interest margins of European banks15. The authors posit that the relationship between 
banks’ gross margin and economic growth depends upon the correlation between prices, 
costs and the economic cycle. Economic growth tends to be negatively related to bank 
prices and costs, however, the extent to which these variables are affected is varied. Carbó 
et al. (2003) state that the net effect of economic growth on bank margins is not clearly 
determined.  
                                                 
15 Maudos and Guevara (2004), Valverde and Fernández (2007) and Lepetit et al. (2008b), amongst others, use 
the Net Interest Margin (NIM) variable as a proxy for bank profitability. The variable measures the difference, 
in terms of yield, between the active interest and passive interest from banking operations undertaken by 
banks, given the asset total. It is similar to the gross margin of non-financial companies. 
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In their analysis of the factors determining the gross margin in European terms, 
Valverde and Fernández (2007) include a dummy which indicates whether the bank 
operates under a bank-based systems (in which bank balance-sheet activities are 
comparatively high in relation to bank credit activities) or a market-based systems (in which 
capital markets activities are comparatively high in relation to bank credit activities). The 
aim of this variable is to show the potential effects on margins in accordance with the 
structure of the financial system. The authors use a composite indicator - a weighted 
average of bank and capital market activities relative to GDP, developed by Levine (2002) - 
to classify the countries in each of the different financial systems.   
 
Microeconomic Factors 
A large part of the literature on the banking sector focuses on the determinants of interest 
margins. In their pioneering study, Ho and Saunders (1981) adopt the concept of banks as 
mere intermediaries between depositors and customers, and state that the interest margins 
have two basic components, namely the degree of competition of the markets and the 
interest rate risk to which the bank is exposed. This model has been extended by several 
studies: Allen (1988) widens it to permit the existence of different types of credits and 
deposits. McShane and Sharpe (1985) change the source of the interest rate risk, situating it 
in the uncertainty of the money market instead of the interest rate on credits and deposits. 
Angbanzo (1997) extends the model to take into account credit risk as well as interest rate 
risk.  
According to the theoretical model developed by Maudos and Guevara (2004), the 
factors determining the “pure” interest margins are as follows: the competitive structure of 
the markets, average operating costs16, risk aversion, the volatility of money market interest 
rates and the credit risk. Maudos and Guevara (2004) also state that, in practice, there may 
be other variables which explain the interest margins, capturing the influence of 
institutional, regulatory and quality of management aspects, which could potentially distort 
the “pure” interest margin and are difficult to incorporate into theoretical models. Saunders 
and Schumacher (2000) also argue that regulation in the form of interest rate restrictions on 
deposits or minimum reserves and solvency ratios might have a significant impact on 
banks’ interest margins. 
                                                 
16 Maudos and Guevara (2004) state that “the extension of the model realized in this paper yield the inclusion of an 
additional term, the average operating costs, in the explanatory equation of the interest margin. Consequently, firms that incur 
high unit costs will logically need to work with higher margins to enable them to cover their higher operating costs. Observe that, 
even in the absence of market power and of any kind of risk, a positive margin will be necessary in order to cover operating costs.” 
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Acharya et al. (2006) find that a U-shape relationship between bank returns and the 
degree of concentration, as a function the level of bank risk. Their results suggest that there 
are some diseconomies of diversification in banks which expand their business activities 
into highly competitive sectors or sectors in which they have no prior experience. The 
results reveal that these effects can emerge in the deterioration of the banks’ loan portfolio 
and simultaneously in reduced profitability (possibly driven by deterioration in the 
effectiveness of banking monitoring, adverse selection, increased general expenditure, or a 
combination of these factors). 
 
3. Sample and Methodology 
3.1. Research Questions 
The paper considers three core research questions. This section will consider each of these 
elements in turn.  
 
I. What is the expected impact of the relative expansion of residential mortgage loans on bank credit risk? 
Does the impact vary over the property price cycle and is it influenced by the institutional characteristics of 
the country where the bank operates? 
The marginal effect of increase in residential mortgage loans on bank credit risk can 
be written as: 
        
           
                                                                        
where RISK is the proxy for credit risk; RMShare is the weight of residential mortgage loans 
in the bank’s total assets and RPPRICE is the growth rate in real residential property prices. 
The results will shed light on whether residential mortgage loans have a positive or 
negative impact on bank credit risk and whether the effect on credit risk increases or 
decreases with the rise in residential property market prices (given by parameter 12). 
Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004), Acharya et. al. (2011) and Martins et al. (2012) state that 
there are significant differences across countries in terms of the characteristics of the 
mortgage credit markets. They show that markets with higher growth rates and less 
conservative lending practises (with for example, high leverage ratios and possibility of 
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extracting capital) also tend to have higher owner occupancy rates. By influencing the level 
of risk-taking by banks, the institutional differences pertaining to the mortgage market may 
help to explain some differences of the impact of residential mortgage loans on bank credit 
risk. It is expected that banks in countries whose credit policy characteristics are less 
conservative have a greater propensity to take risks. 
 
II. What is the expected impact of the relative expansion of residential mortgage loans on bank 
profitability? Does the impact vary over the residential property price cycle? 
The marginal effect of increase in residential mortgage loans on bank profitability 
can be written as: 
          
           
                                                                        
where MARGIN is the proxy for bank profitability; RMShare is the weight of residential 
mortgage loans in the bank’s total assets and RPPRICE is the real residential property 
growth rate or the accumulated growth rate of real housing prices.  
The results will allow an evaluation of whether residential mortgage loans have a 
positive or negative impact on bank profitability and if the effect on bank profitability 
increases or decreases with the rise in residential property prices (given by parameter 13). 
Herring and Wachter (1999) state that during upswings in property cycle, banks 
may underestimate the default risk on mortgages loans. This may result in banks changing 
their attitudes towards risk throughout the cycle or when there are distortions in the loan 
decision process. Chan et al. (1986) show that increased competition erodes the surplus that 
banks can earn by identifying high-quality borrowers. The reduction in value leads banks to 
reduce their screening of potential borrowers and, thus the overall credit quality in the 
portfolio declines. In a context of asymmetric information, Marquez (2002) notes that an 
increase in the number of banks in a market leads to a dispersion of borrower-specific 
information and will result in not only higher funding costs for low-quality borrowers but 
also in easier access to credit for low-quality borrowers. The customers to whom banks 
lend later in the cycle may not only be of lower credit quality but in addition, they may have 
borrowed more in terms of LTV. This leads to a combined impact. Firstly, they are 
purchasing properties at higher prices due to buying later in the cycle. This together with 
higher borrowing, in terms of LTV, leads to such borrowers being more vulnerable to 
17 
 
negative equity17. Thus it is likely that the impact of residential mortgage loans on bank 
profitability will vary over the residential property price cycle. 
As mentioned above, while traditional banking theory, based on the delegated 
monitoring argument, recommends that the optimal bank loan policy is to diversify as 
much as possible, Elyasiani and Deng (2004) and Acharya et al. (2006), in turn, suggest the 
possible existence of diseconomies of diversification. They state that the relationship 
between profitability and the degree of concentration of banking activity could be a 
nonlinear function of bank risk. From traditional portfolio theory, we know that 
diversification increases the central tendency of the distribution of loan portfolio returns. 
However, when debt is risky and the level of debt is above the central tendency of the 
distribution, diversification can in fact increase the probability of bank insolvency (Winton, 
1999). This would occur, for example, if the downside risk of bank loans is substantial.  
Another additional factor reinforcing the non-linear relationship between bank 
returns and the weight of residential mortgage loans in total assets is the conflict of 
interests between bank owners and bank creditors. More specifically, an increase in the 
probability of insolvency reduces the incentive for bank owners to monitor their loans. If 
the loan portfolio has high downside risk (i.e., a high probability of asset returns falling 
below deposits thus making the bank insolvent), then an improvement in loan monitoring 
and, in turn in loan quality, produces greater benefits to the creditors than to the bank 
owners. Since the cost of monitoring is borne by the bank owners (the residual claimants), 
an increase in diversification weakens the incentives for bank owners to monitor loans. 
This, in turn, leads to lower returns for the bank.  
Given the above arguments, the relationship between residential mortgage loans 
and profitability could be a non-linear, U-shaped, function of the level of risk. This is the 
last question we address: 
 
III. Is the relationship between bank profitability and residential mortgage loans a non-linear function? Is 
the relationship between bank profitability and residential mortgage loans a function of the level of risk?  
The marginal effect of the increase residential mortgage loans (RMShare) on bank 
profitability can be described as: 
                                                 
17 This impact was particularly evident during the subprime crisis. Default and foreclosure rates for loans 
originated in 2006 and 2007 were substantially higher than loans originated prior to 2005. 
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where MARGIN is the proxy for bank profitability; RMSHARE is the weight of residential 
mortgage loans in the bank’s total assets and RISK is the proxy for bank credit risk. 
If the marginal effect of the concentration on residential mortgage loans on bank 
profitability is a U-shaped function of the level of risk, then 13 < 0 and 14 > 0.     
 
3.2. Variables and Model Specifications 
 
3.2.1. Bank Credit Risk Model 
In order to study the effects of residential mortgage loans on bank credit risk, we 
estimate following model: 
                     
 
   
                      
                      
 
   
                  
              
 
   
               
 
   
            
                                         
                                                                                                                    
 
where RISK is the proxy for bank i credit risk as measured by the ratio between loan loss 
provisions to net loans in period t18; RMSHAREi is the weight of residential mortgage 
loans in terms of the total assets of the bank; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms 
of the residential housing prices (in the country or region, for those banks whose exposure 
to the real estate market is at a regional level). Table 1 presents the residential housing price 
series used in this study. In the main they are the primary residential house price indices 
used in each respective market. It should be highlighted that the index construction 
methods do vary across markets. Therefore, whilst some indices are based upon hedonic 
models, others are either weighted or simple average house price series. This is somewhat 
inevitable given the variety of index providers used.  
                                                 
18 Angbazo (1997), Salas and Saurina (2002), Maudos and Guevara (2004), Acharya et al. (2006) and Lepetit et 
al. (2008a, 2008b), amongst others, also use this ratio as a measurement of bank credit risk.  
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_____________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 1 
_____________________________ 
We use the following control variables. GDP is real GDP growth; DFAM is the 
ratio between the liabilities of families and GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities 
of companies and GDP; LOAN_TO_ASSETSi is the ratio between the bank’s total credit 
and total assets; INEFi is the ratio of operating costs to gross income; SIZEi is the ratio 
between the bank’s assets and banking industry aggregate assets; MARGINi is the proxy for 
bank profitability measured by net interest margin (gross margin); EQUITYi is the ratio 
between equity capital and total assets; PREMi is the difference between interest income 
over total assets and the interbank interest rate; The ηi captures the unobservable effects of 
the intrinsic characteristics of bank i (such as managers’ risk-aversion and preferences). εit is 
the error term The detailed definition of the variables and the expected relationships are 
shown in table 219. 
_____________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 2 
___________________________ 
  
                                                 
19 For a more depth explanation of risk management importance and determinants of credit risk, please refer 
to Freixas and Rochet (2008).  
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3.2.2. Profitability Model  
We estimate the following linear regression:  
                         
 
   
                   
 
   
        
           
 
   
             
 
   
                
                          
 
   
           
                                        
                                                                                                                   
As above, we use the Net Interest Margin as a proxy for bank profitability 
(MARGIN)20. RMSHAREi and RPPRICE are defined as above. The following control 
variables are used. BBMBi is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the bank operates in 
a bank-based system and the value 0 if bank operates in a market-based system. RISKi is 
defined as above and lagged two and three periods. LIQi is the ratio of Liquid Assets to 
Short Term Funding. SDR3M is a proxy for interest rate risk and is given by lagged annual 
standard deviation of daily interbank 3 month interest rates. HHI is the Herfindahl and 
Hirschman Index. ΔLOANi is the rate of growth of credit loans. IPPi are Implicit Interest 
Payments given by the ratio of Non-Interest Expenses – Non-Interest Revenues to Total Assets. 
The other variables are defined as above. The detailed definition of these variables and the 
expected relationships are shown in table 3. 
 
_____________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 3 
_____________________________ 
 
                                                 
20  Angbazo (1997), Saunders and Schumacher (2000), Maudos and Guevara (2004), Valverde and Fernández 
(2007) and Lepetit et al. (2008b) amongst others, also use this proxy. 
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In order to assess if the relationship between bank profitability and residential 
mortgage loans credit is a U-shaped function of the level of risk we estimate the following 
regression: 
                         
 
   
                   
 
   
        
           
 
   
             
 
   
                
                          
 
   
                      
                                            
    
                                                                                                                              
 
We also consider the impact of mortgage credit market characteristics on bank 
credit risk and profitability. For this purpose, the variable LTV (the average loan to value 
ratio in the country where the bank operates) is added to equations (4) to (6). 
 
3.3. Dynamic Panel Data Models  
Salas and Saurina (2002) and Valverde and Fernández (2007) suggest using first-differences 
of the equations above in the estimation of the dynamic panel data models, in order to 
eliminate bank-specific effects (see Arellano and Bond, 1988 and 1991).  
In the appendix, we provide details the dynamic panel model. The unobservable 
individual effects (ηi) in equations (4) to (6) tend to be correlated with other explanatory 
variables. For example, in the credit risk model, ηi tends to be correlated with the managers’ 
(unobservable) risk preferences and with the lagged loan provision ratio. If equations (4), 
(5) and (6) are expressed in first differences from the variables, the individual effects will be 
eliminated. Yet, by using static panel data estimation, estimates would be biased given that 
the transformed lagged dependent variables will still be correlated with the transformed 
error terms. Furthermore, the explanatory variable weight, RMShare, is endogenous, and 
should therefore be defined with adequate instrumental variables. In particular, three 
variables are treated as endogenous in the estimation. These are the proxies for credit risk 
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(RISK), profitability (MARGIN) and the weight of residential mortgage loans in bank’s 
total assets (RMShare).  
To overcome the aforementioned biases, we use linear GMM estimation. The 
instrumental variables for the endogenous variables are the same variables lagged 
throughout a number of periods, (h), sufficient to prevent the second-order autocorrelation 
of residuals (Salas and Saurina, 2002). In equation (4) the dependent variable is 
transformed, since the ratio of loans provisions to loans is a truncated variable (between 
zero and one), and is therefore not suitable for the GMM procedure. 
Jimenez et al. (2012) show that changes in EU monetary policy affects bank lending 
and bank risk-taking in all EU countries. They analyze the effects of monetary conditions 
and economic activity on the granting of loans with individual loan applications records 
depending on the strength of bank balance sheets measured by bank capital and liquidity 
ratios. To capture omitted variables that vary across time (and affect all banks in EU), they 
control for time-varying observed and unobserved firms heterogeneity with firm-month 
fixed effects (i.e. there is a dummy for every-year or month combination). As in Jimenez et 
al. (2012) to analyze and quantify the effects of residential property loans on bank 
performance, we include observable bank characteristics and bank fixed effects in the 
specifications, thereby inevitably weakening performance identification. Therefore, we 
report estimations with and without time fixed effects. 
 
3.4. Sample 
The sample is composed of an unbalanced panel of annual data, obtained from the 
financial reports and accounts of 555 banks within the EU-15 countries for the period 
from 1995 to 2008. The use of lagged variables reduces the time period of the estimations; 
bank credit risk regressions and profitability regressions are estimated, respectively, 
between 1999 to 2008 and 2002 to 2008. The following table presents the distribution of 
banks analyzed by country and by specialisation.  
_____________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 4 
______________________________ 
The data was obtained from BANKSCOPE. Banks with less than three consecutive 
years of observations, or missing information in terms of the explanatory variables, were 
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excluded. With regard to some banks, there is no information available in BANKSCOPE 
regarding the amount of residential mortgage loans. In these situations, the information 
was collected from banks’ annual reports and accounts21. 
We chose residential mortgage loans rather than full mortgage loans due to the 
absence and poor quality of price data in other segments of the real estate market for the 
majority of countries considered, and the lack of detailed segmentation of the non-
residential mortgage loans. 
The data relating to the concentration index, interbank market interest rates; 
residential housing prices; families’ and companies’ indebtedness ratios and GDP were 
obtained from the European Central Bank, DATASTREAM, BIS House Prices and 
EUROSTAT, respectively. 
Tables 5 and 6 present the descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the 
estimation of the credit risk and profitability models. 
_____________________________ 
INSERT TABLES 5 and 6 
                                 _____________________________ 
An analysis per country shows us that Spain, United Kingdom, and Ireland are the 
countries with the highest weights of residential mortgage loans in terms of total bank 
assets. This is not particularly surprising given the high house price appreciation observed 
prior to 2007 in each of the countries. Additionally, banks in these countries operate under 
less conservative credit policies (Martins et al. 2012). These markets have some of the 
highest owner-occupancy rates in the EU-15. It is therefore not surprising that three 
countries are the countries with the proportionate weight in residential mortgage loans. In 
contrast, markets such as Germany and Austria not only have more conservative lending 
practices (Martins et al. 2012) but also experienced far lower rates of house price 
appreciation and the weight of residential mortgage loans in terms of total assets is 
substantially lower.  
 
 
                                                 
21 IAS14 (substituted by IFRS 8 on 1st January 2008) “Operating Segments” require companies to disclose the 
main operating segments. Given the importance of residential mortgage loans in the activity of the banks 
analysed, it is possible – by looking at the annual report and accounts – to calculate the amount of residential 
mortgage loans.  
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4. Results 
4.1. Credit Risk Model 
Table 7 (panel A) shows the results for the estimates of the credit risk model regression (4). 
Panel B shows the estimated coefficients for relevant subsamples of banks. The results 
suggest that banks that increase their exposure to residential mortgage loans decrease credit 
risk. The results are in line with Pensala and Solttila (1993), Randall (1993), Murto (1994), 
Domowitz and Sartain (1999). The results also show that during the upturn in residential 
market prices cycle, a rise in residential mortgage lending leads to a decrease in bank credit 
risk. 
________________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 7  
                                    ________________________________ 
 
Martins et al. (2011) argue that due to the accentuated process of bank 
internationalisation and integration at a regional and international level, real estate assets 
tend to be related with regional or international residential prices. The authors therefore 
suggest the use of regional or international indices of residential housing prices as a proxy 
for the real estate risk factor. Regression VI in table 7 assesses the effects of altering the 
proxy associated with residential property prices in the case of banks whose exposure to 
real estate is at a regional or international scale22. The results reveal that an increase in the 
weight of residential mortgage loans in total assets leads to a greater decrease in credit risk.  
Despite the possibility of a “disaster myopia” phenomenon, whereby the quality of 
bank assets may deteriorate without the banks being aware that they are accepting a higher 
risk level, Laeven and Majnoni (2003) state that there tends to be a policy of delaying the 
recognition of loan losses provisions until the phase when property prices collapse. This 
being the case, the relationship between residential mortgage loans and credit risk tends to 
be only recognized in bank balance sheets a posteriori, namely during a collapse in property 
prices. Therefore, these results must be taken with caution and in this context. 
                                                 
22 Martins et al. (2011) consider that a bank is exposed to the real estate market at a regional level when its 
assets portfolio associated with the real estate sector on the international market represents 40% or more. In 
order to measure the geographical exposure to the real estate sector, they analyze the banks’ annual reports 
and accounts, namely the primary and secondary segment reporting, which banks are obliged to disclose in 
accordance with IAS 14 and IFRS 8. 
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Most of the control variables coefficients show the expected sign, although some 
are not statistically significant. The GDP growth rate (current and lagged one-year) has a 
negative effect on credit risk, as predicted by the theory. For the other two macroeconomic 
variables, families and companies’ indebtedness, the coefficient is, respectively positive and 
significant, as expected, and negative but not at a statistically significant degree. The weight 
of credit in bank assets and banks’ relative size also affects the level of loans provision, as 
expected. The results illustrate that larger banks seem to account for a lower relative weight 
of loan provisions in their balance sheets. 
The variables associated with the inefficiency level and solvency ratio are not 
statistically significant at conventional levels. This may be the result of multicolinearity 
issues. With regard to the solvency ratio, Davis and Zhu (2009) state that its effect on 
credit risk is unclear. The authors state that when the solvency ratio is high, the incentives 
for taking risks are lower. Therefore, a negative sign is to be expected. However, capital 
ratios that are too-low may lead to banks to “gamble for resurrection”. This may lead to having 
the opposite impact on banks’ lending decisions.  
Banks’ interest margins are statistically significant. As for the proxy for the risk 
premium, it is statistically insignificant in the regressions for all the banks (panels A and C), 
and statistically significant in 3 of the 4 regressions (panel B) and in 2 of the 4 regressions 
(panel D) for the subsamples. Salas and Saurina (2002) state that it might be possible not to 
find a positive impact if strong competition introduces cross-subsidization of products 
inside banks.  
The aim of regressions IV, V, XIV and XV shown in table 7 (panels A and C) is to 
analyse the impact of institutional factors on bank credit risk. We use the “Loan-to-Value” 
(LTV) ratio, obtained from the ECB, which corresponds to the average loan-to-value ratio 
in the country where the bank operates. The LTV ratios are used due to the absence of 
information set out individually by banks regarding these ratios. Regressions IV, V, XIV 
and XV show that countries with higher LTV ratios observe higher level of loan losses 
provisions.  
In panels C and D (table 7) we add time fixed effects to the bank fixed effects in all 
regressions. Time fixed effects capture the changes in economy wide conditions, such as 
current and future expectations of GDP growth, inflation, and interest rates and general 
shocks affecting the economy. The results obtained are in line with those obtained in panel 
A. 
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We repeat the regressions based on subsamples of banks (panel B). Regressions VII 
and VIII refer, respectively, to the clusters of Germany and Austria, and Spain, Ireland and 
the United Kingdom. Results suggest that the impact of increasing residential mortgage 
loans on total assets leads to a greater credit risk reduction in the cluster formed by 
Germany and Austria. This reduction is more notorious in estimations with time fixed 
effects (regression XVII on panel D). Moreover, the regression XVIII (with time fixed 
effects) shows that in the cluster of Spain, Ireland and United Kingdom, the impact of 
increasing residential mortgage loans on total assets leads to an increase in  credit risk.    
Regressions IX and X analyze the effects of increasing residential mortgage loans on bank 
credit risk in the 1st and 4th quartiles of banks, divided on the basis of the weight of 
residential mortgage loans on total credit. The results reveal that an increase in residential 
mortgage loans results in a decrease in credit risk, which is greater in those banks with less 
residential mortgage loans. Identical conclusions, but more pronounced, are also found in 
regressions XIX and XX estimated with time fixed effects.  
The empirical models were estimated by making some alterations in order to assess 
the robustness of the results. Firstly, to avoid some of the multicolinearity issues, we 
remove from the model all of the lagged variables where the coefficient was not statistically 
significant. Our conclusions remain unchanged. Second, all the results (signs and 
significance of parameters) hold if the risk premium does not appear in regressions or if 
another proxy is used. The results are available upon request from the authors. 
Finally, the hypotheses of the absence of a time series second order correlation (the 
regressions were estimated in the first difference) and of the validity of the instruments 
used (Sargan test) are not rejected.  
 
4.2. Profitability Model 
 Table 8 (panel A) presents the results of the linear regressions between bank 
profitability and the weight of residential mortgage loans in total assets, specified by 
equation (5). The five regressions reveal that those banks increasing their weight of 
residential mortgage loans in total assets saw their profitability rise during the period 
analyzed: the coefficient associated with the variable RMSHARE is positive and statistically 
significant. By looking at regression II, we conclude that bank profitability tends to 
decrease during an upturn in the residential property cycle. This can be at least partly 
27 
 
explained by the “disaster myopia” phenomenon. As discussed above, during strong price 
appreciation in the housing market, banks tend to expand credit to riskier customers and 
collateral requirements tend to decrease (see Jimenez et al. 2006, Dell’Ariccia et al. 2008 and 
Demyanyk and van Hemert, 2011). Accordingly, both the credit portfolio quality and the 
profitability are damaged by increasing competition (e.g. Chan et al. 1986, Hellman et al. 
2000 and Marquez 2002). These conclusions are also corroborated by regressions IV and 
V, where the residential property prices variable is replaced by the cumulative real growth 
of residential property prices in the country (or region, in the case of regression V) where a 
bank operates.  
 The conclusion that bank profitability tends to decrease during an upturn in the 
residential property cycle is also corroborated by regressions X to XIV (panel C), estimated 
with time fixed effects. There is however no statistical evidence in estimations with time 
fixed effects, that those banks that increased their weight of residential mortgage loans in 
total assets saw their profitability rising. 
_____________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 8 
                                  ______________________________ 
 
Table 8 (panel B) tests the hypothesis of a non-linear relationship between 
profitability and the weight of residential mortgage loans in accordance with equation (6). 
The results support the hypothesis that there is a U-shaped non-linear relationship. The 
coefficients of the interaction variables, RMSHAREit* RISKit-1 and RMSHAREit* (RISKit-1)
2, 
are negative and positive, respectively, and statistically significant at conventional levels. 
This conclusion is also corroborated by regression XV to XVIII in panel D (with time 
fixed effects). The results of the F statistic to test for the significance of the linear and 
quadratic terms, separately and together, reveal that the coefficients of these variables are 
statistically significant, contributing towards increasing the explanatory power of the 
regression.   
By analysing the coefficients of the control variables, it can be seen that the lagged 
MARGIN variable reveals a statistically significant positive sign. In the majority of 
regressions, credit risk, liquidity risk, interest rate risk and the concentration index are also 
statistically significant with a positive effect on banks’ profitability. This is consistent with 
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previous findings (e.g. Angbazo, 1997). The results also illustrate that inefficient banks tend 
to have lower profitability margins, in line with studies such as Maudos and Guevara 
(2004).  The positive statistically significant sign associated with the solvency ratio, in 
majority of specifications, could suggest that banks require a premium in their margins, due 
to the pressures of ensuring solvency by regulators. The negative and statistically significant 
coefficient of the ΔLOAN variable (loan growth rate) suggests that banks that register high 
loan growth may be required to work with lower banking margins, as suggested by Petersen 
and Rajan (1995) and supported by the findings of Valverde and Fernandéz (2007). The 
IPP variable (implicit interest payments) has a positive coefficient and is statistically 
significant, for the majority of regressions. This variable reflects extra payments to 
depositors through service charge remission or other types of transfers due to competition 
in the market for deposits. These extra payments tend to cause an increase in the banks 
gross margins consistent with the results of Angbazo (1997). The GDP growth rate also 
shows a positive and statistically significant effect on banks’ gross margins. Finally, the 
dummy associated with the structure of financial systems, reveals that a bank-based system 
tends to produce larger gross margins than countries that operate a market-based financial 
system. 
The coefficient associated with the country’s average LTV ratio, which is acting as a 
proxy for the institutional characteristics of the mortgage market, is positive and statistical 
significant. This would suggest that banks in countries where credit practices are less 
conservative (high leverage ratios) tend to require a higher profitability margins. Equations 
VIII, IX, XVII and XVIII are estimated for banks’ 1st quartile and 4th quartile, in line with 
the weight of residential mortgage loans to total loans, respectively. Finally, the non-
rejection of the null hypotheses of the Sargan test and the second-order autocorrelation test 
allow us to conclude drawn from the estimated models appear supported.   
 
4.3. Effects of Residential Mortgage Loans on Banks’ Risk-Adjusted Profitability  
The effects of residential mortgage loans should be studied both in terms of the 
profitability and credit risk. If the increased weight of residential mortgage loans on total 
assets produces an increase in profitability (without time fixed effects) or no profitability 
impact (with time fixed effects) and a decrease in credit risk, then the final effect is an 
improvement in risk-adjusted profitability. When both bank profitability and credit risk 
increase or decrease, the overall effect on the bank’s risk-adjusted profitability is ambiguous 
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and cannot be ascertained without taking a stance on what constitutes an “efficient” risk-
profitability trade-off.   
The effects of residential mortgage loans on bank profitability and risk during 
property booms are summarised in table 9, based on the empirical evidence reported in 
tables 7 and 8: 
_____________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 9 
                                  ______________________________ 
 
From table 9, we can draw the following two conclusions for the sample of banks 
and period analyzed: 
1) Increasing the weight of residential mortgage loans relative to total assets results 
in an efficient trade-off between risk and profitability. More specifically, bank 
profitability tends not to be affected or even tends to be slightly reduced by 
increasing the weight in the case of banks with low to moderate insolvency risk. 
For high insolvency risk banks an increase in the proportion of residential 
mortgage lending leads to an increase in profitability. Since credit risk tends to 
decrease with as residential lending increases banks with high insolvency risk 
see an improvement in their risk-adjusted profitability. 
2) The effect of an increasing weight on banks with moderate insolvency risks 
cannot be correctly ascertained without reference to how much the bank’s 
profitability should increase via a unitary increase in bank risk23. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 In practice, many banks use a risk-adjusted return on capital framework to determine whether such loans 
are beneficial. Commonly the return per unit of risk of the loan should exceed some cost of capital 
benchmark specified by the bank such as the after-tax ROE of the bank. 
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5. Conclusion 
The paper evaluates the effects of increasing the weight of residential mortgage 
loans on bank risk and profitability using a sample of 555 banks within the EU-15, over the 
period from 1995 to 2008. The results indicate that residential mortgage loans have a 
significant impact on bank performance.  
The results suggest that increasing the weight of residential mortgage loans tends to 
result into a decrease in bank credit risk. This is explained by the fact that this asset is used 
as collateral to obtain other loans and is perceived by banks as contributing towards 
reducing credit risk. The results obtained show that the decrease in credit risk as result of 
an increase in the weight of residential mortgage loans is higher during the upturn in the 
residential property price cycle and in countries with more conservative lending practices. 
This result may help to explain why banks rush to lend on property during booms due to 
the positive effects it has on credit risk. The results also show that bank profitability tends 
to decrease during the upturn in the residential property price cycle.  
The results also reveal the existence of a non-linear relationship (U-shaped marginal 
effect), function of the level of bank’s risk, between profitability and the weight of 
residential mortgage loans on total assets. For those banks with high credit risk, an 
increasing weight of residential mortgage loans on total assets tends to raise the bank’s risk-
adjusted profitability. For banks with a moderate credit risk, the effects of increasing weight 
of residential mortgage loans on banks’ risk-adjusted profitability is also positive or 
marginally positive.  
The results highlight the need to develop indicators of bank’s individual exposure 
to the real estate market to calibrate the potential impact of changes in weights and prices 
of residential housing assets on bank risk and profitability.  
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Appendix 
The Dynamic Panel Data Model  
This appendix presents the Dynamic Panel Data Model used in this study. We use the first-
difference of the equations to estimate in order to eliminate the bank-specific effects (see 
Arellano and Bond, 1988 and 1991). Yet, this procedure introduces a new error term which 
is correlated to the lagged dependent variable introduced among the set of explanatory 
variables. Arellano and Bond (1991) address this correlation, together with possible 
endogeneity problems, by proposing the use of lagged variables of the explanatory variables 
in levels as instrumental variables and the two-step GMM estimator. In the first step, the 
error terms are assumed to be both independent and homoskedastic, across banks and over 
time. In the second step, residuals obtained in the first step are used to construct a 
consistent estimate of the variance-covariance matrix, thus relaxing the assumptions of 
independence and homoskedasticity. Griliches and Hausman (1986) reveal that the 
“difference estimator” has been found to exacerbate measurement error biases. An alternative 
method is used in this paper to estimate the regression in differences jointly with the 
regression level, as proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995). As shown by Blundell and 
Bond (1998), this system estimator reduces the potential biases in finite samples and 
asymptotic imprecision associated with the difference estimator. The estimator uses the 
lagged differences of the explanatory variables as instruments. They are valid instruments 
under the assumption that the correlation between the bank-specific effect and the levels of 
the explanatory variables is constant over the time.  
The consistency of the GMM estimator depends both on the validity of the assumption of 
absence of serial correlation of the error term and on the validity of the instruments. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest two tests to validate these assumptions. The first is the 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions. This tests the overall validity of the instruments 
by analysing the sample analogue of the moment conditions used in the estimation 
procedure. The Sargan test is based on the observation that the residuals should be 
uncorrelated with the set of exogenous variables when the instruments are truly exogenous. 
This statistic will be asymptotically chi-squared under the null hypothesis that the error 
term is uncorrelated with the instruments. The second test, examines the assumption of no 
serial correlation in the error terms. We test if the differenced error term is first-order 
serially correlated. Under the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation, this test 
has a standard-normal distribution. 
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The general model, which closely follows the Arellano and Bond (1988) model, is a single 
equation with individual effects. The equation takes the form: 
 
                                                         
 
   (A-1) 
 
where, ηi  and     are respectively, the individual and temporal effects, xit is the vector of the 
explanatory variables, B(L) is the vector of associated polynomials in the lag operator, and q 
is the maximum lag length in the model (      indicates  transpose). The number of time 
periods available on the ith individual is Ti. The νit are assumed to be independently 
distributed across individuals with a zero mean, but arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity 
across units and time are possible. The xit may or may not be correlated with the individual 
ηi effects and for each of these cases the effects may be strictly exogenous, predetermined, 
or endogenous variables with respect to νit. 
 The (Ti – q) equations for the individual i can be written conveniently as follows: 
 
                                   ,                                                                               (A-2) 
 
where σ is a parameter vector including the αk’s, the β’s and the λ’s, and Wi is a data matrix 
containing the time series of the lagged dependent variables and the x’s. Finally, ti is a 
vector (Ti – q)*1 of ones. The dynamic panel data can be used to estimate various linear 
GMM estimators of σ with the general form: 
 
                        
           
     
      
            
   
                         (A-3) 
 
where           
 
 
   
       
                                                                            (A-4) 
 
and   
  and   
  refer to transformations of Wi and yi (example, levels, first differences, 
orthogonal deviations, deviations from individual means). Zi is the matrix of instrumental 
variables. Hi is a possible individual specific weighting matrix.   
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When estimating dynamic models, transformations that allow the use of lagged (and pre-
determined) endogenous variables as instruments in transformed equations should be used. 
Where there are no instruments available that are uncorrelated with the individual effects 
  , the transformation should eliminate this component of the error term. The first 
difference transformation is one example of a transformation that eliminates    from the 
transformed error term without entering all the lagged values of the perturbation term     
in the transformed error term. Hence, this transformation allows the use of suitably lagged 
(and pre-determined) endogenous variables as instruments. 
 
 
    
34 
 
References 
[1] Acharya, Viral, Iftekhar Hasan and Anthony Saunders, 2006, “Should Bank Be 
Diversified? Evidence from Individual Bank Loan Portfolios”, Journal of Business, 79 (3): 
1355-1412. 
[2] Acharya, Viral, Matthew Richardson, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh and Lawrence White, 
2011, Guaranteed to Fail: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Debacle of Mortgage Finance, Princeton 
University Press.  
[3] Allen, Linda, 1988, “The Determinants of Bank Interest Margins: A note”, Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 23 (2): 231-235. 
[4] Allen, Franklin and Douglas Gale, 2000, “Bubbles and Crises”, The Economic Journal, 
110 (460): 236-255. 
[5] Altunbas, Yener, Lynne Evans and Philip Molyneux, 2001, “Bank Ownership and 
Efficiency”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 33: 925-954. 
[6] Angbazo, Lazarus, 1997, “Commercial Bank Interest Margins, Default Risk, 
Interest-Rate Risk, and Off-Balance Sheet Banking”, Journal of Banking and Finance 21 (1): 
55-87.   
[7] Arellano, Manuel and Stephen Bond, 1988, “Dynamic Panel Data Estimation Using 
DPD - A Guide for Users”, working paper 88/15, The Institute for Fiscal Studies, London. 
[8] Arellano, Manuel and Stephen Bond, 1991, “Some Test of Specification for Panel 
Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and Application to Employment Equations”, Review of 
Economic Studies, 58 (1): 277-97. 
[9] Arellano, Manuel and Olympia Bover, 1995, “Another Look at the Instrumental-
Variable Estimation of Error Components Models”, Journal of Econometrics, 68: 29-52.  
[10] Berger, Allen and Robert DeYoung, 1997, “Problem Loans and Cost Efficiency in 
Commercial Banks”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 21: 849-870. 
[11] Berger, Allen and Gregory Udell, 2004, “The Institutional Memory Hypothesis and 
the Procyclicality of Bank Lending Behavior”, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 13 (4): 458-
495.   
[12] Bernanke, Ben, Mark Gertler and Simon Gilchrist, 1994, “The Financial 
Accelerator and the Flight to Quality”, Review of Economics and Statistics 78: 1-15. 
35 
 
[13] Blundell, Richard and Stephen Bond, 1998, “Initial Conditions and Moment 
Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models”, Journal of Econometrics, 87 (1): 115-143.  
[14] Borio, Claudio, Craig Furfine and Philip Lowe, 2001, “Procyclicality of the 
Financial System and Financial Stability: Issues and Policy Options”, BIS Papers 1: 1-57. 
[15] Carbó, Santiago, David Humphrey and Francisco Rodriguez, 2003, “Deregulation, 
Bank Competition and Regional Growth”, Regional Studies, 37: 227-237. 
[16] Case, Karl and Robert Shiller, 1989, “The Efficiency of the Market for Single 
Family Homes”, American Economic Review, 79: 125-137. 
[17] Cetorelli, Nicola and Michele Gambera, 2002, “Banking Market Structure, Financial 
Dependence and Growth: International Evidence from Industry Data”, Journal of Finance, 
56: 617-648. 
[18] Chan, Yuk-Shee, Stuart Greenbaum and Anjan Thakor, 1986, “Information 
Reusability, Competition and Bank Asset Quality”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 10 (2): 
243-253. 
[19] Clair, Robert, 1992, “Loan Growth and Loan Quality: Some Preliminary Evidence 
from Texas Banks”, Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Third Quarter: 9-22. 
[20] Coles, Adrian and Judith Hardt, 2000, “Mortgage Markets: Why US and EU 
Markets Are So Different”, Housing Studies, 15 (5): 775-783. 
[21] Dalglish, Toby, 2009, “What Motivates a Subprime Borrower to Default ?”, Journal 
of Banking & Finance, 33: 681-693. 
[22] Davis, Philip, 1992, Debt, Financial Fragility, and Systemic Risk. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1992. 
[23] Davis, Philip and Haibin Zhu, 2009, “Commercial Property Prices and Bank 
Performance”, Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 49 (4): 1341-59. 
[24] Dell’Ariccia, Giovanni, Deniz Igan and Luc Laeven, 2008, “Credit Booms and 
Lending Standards: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market”, CEPR Discussion Paper 
n.º DP6683. 
[25] Demyanyk, Yuliya and Otto van Hemert, 2011, “Understanding the Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis”, The Review of Financial Studies, 24 (6): 1848-1880. 
36 
 
[26] Diamond, Douglas, 1984, “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring”, 
Review of Economic Studies, 51 (3): 393-414. 
[27] Domowitz, Ian and Robert Sartain, 1999, “Determinants of the Consumer 
Bankruptcy Decision”, Journal of Finance, 54 (1): 403-420. 
[28] ECB, 2005, “EU Banking Structures”, ECB, October, 2005. 
[29] ECB, 2010, “Structural Indicators for the EU Banking Sector”, ECB, January 2010. 
[30] Elyasiani, Elyas and Saiying Deng, 2004, “Diversification Effects on the 
Performance of Financial Services Firms”, working paper, Temple University, Philadelphia. 
[31] Freixas, Xavier and Jean-Charles Rochet, 2008, Microeconomics of Banking, Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press. 
[32] Gerardi, Kristopher, Adam Hale Shapiro and Paul S. Willen, 2007, “Subprime 
Outcomes: Risky Mortgages, Homeownership Experiences and Foreclosure”, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper No. 07-15 
[33] Gentle, Christopher, Daniel Dorling and James Cornford, 1994, “Negative Equity 
and British Housing in the 1990s: Cause and Effect”, Urban Studies 31 (2): 181-199. 
[34] Griliches, Zvi and Jerry Hausman, 1986, “Errors in Variables in Panel Data”, 
Journal of Econometrics, 31 (1): 93-118. 
[35] Guttentag, Jack and Richard Herring, 1984, “Credit Rationing and Financial 
Disorder”, Journal of Finance, 39: 1359-1382. 
[36] Guttentag, Jack and Richard Herring, 1985, “Commercial Bank Lending to 
Developing Countries: From Overlending to Underlending to Structural Reform” in 
International Debt and the Developing Countries, edited by Smith e Cuddington, World Bank. 
[37] Guttentag, Jack and Richard Herring, 1986, Disaster Myopia in International Banking, 
Princeton University Essays in International Finance, 164, September. 
[38] Hardt, Judith, 2000, “European Mortgage Markets: Structure, Funding and Future 
Development”, OECD, June 2000. 
[39] Hellman, Thomas, Kevin Murdock and Joseph Stigltz, 2000, “Liberalization, Moral 
Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?”, 
American Economic Review, 90 (1): 147-165. 
37 
 
[40] Herring, Richard and Susan Wachter, 1999, “Real Estate Booms and Banking 
Busts: An International Perspective”, Occasional Papers Group of Thirty 58. 
[41] Hilbers, Paul, Qin Lei and Lisbeth Zacho, 2001, “Real Estate Market 
Developments and Financial Sector Soundness”, IMF Working Paper 129. 
[42] Ho, Thomas and Anthony Saunders, 1981, “The Determinants of Banking Interest 
Margins: Theory and Empirical Evidence”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 16 
(4): 581-600. 
[43] Horta, Paulo, Carlos Mendes and Isabel Vieira, 2008, “Contagion Effects of the US 
Subprime Crisis on Developed Countries”, CEFAGE-UE working paper 2008/08. 
[44] Hwang, Inchang, Francis In and Tong Kim, 2010, “Contagion Effects of the US 
Subprime Crisis on International Stock Markets”, working paper. 
( http://ssrn.com/abstract=1536349).  
[45] Jimenez, Gabriel, Steven Ongena, José-Luis Peydró and Jesús Saurina, 2012, 
“Credit Supply and Monetary Policy: Identifying the Bank Balance-Sheet Channel with 
Loan Applications”, American Economic Review, 102 (5): 2301-2326. 
[46] Jimenez, Gabriel, Vicente Salas and Jesús Saurina, 2006, “Determinants of 
Collateral”, Journal of Financial Economics, 81 (2): 255-281. 
[47] Keeton, William and Charles Morris, 1988, “Why Do Bank’s Loan Losses Differ?” 
Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City: 3-21.  
[48] Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro and John Moore, 1997, “Credit Cycles”, Journal of Political 
Economy, 105: 211-248. 
[49] Kwan, Simon and Robert Eisenbeis, 1997, “Bank Risk, Capitalization, and 
Operating Efficiency”, Journal of Financial Service Research, 12: 117-131. 
[50] Laeven, Luc and Giovanni Majnoni, 2003 “Loan Loss Provisioning and Economic 
Slowdowns: Too Much, Too Late?”, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 12: 178-197. 
[51] Lepetit, Laetitia, Emmanuelle Nys, Philippe Rous and Amine Tarazi, 2008a, “Bank 
Income Structure and Risk: An Empirical Analysis of European Banks”, Journal of Banking 
and Finance, 32: 1452-67. 
[52] Lepetit, Laetitia, Emmanuelle Nys, Philippe Rous and Amine Tarazi, 2008b, “The 
Expansion of Services in European Banking: Implications for Loan Pricing and Interest 
Margins”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 32: 2325-35. 
38 
 
[53] Levine, Ross, 2002, “Bank-Based or Market-Based Financial Systems: Which Is 
Better?”, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 11: 398-428. 
[54] Malpezzi, Stephen and Susan Wachter, 2005, “The Role of Speculation in Real 
Estate Cycles”, Journal of Real Estate Literature, 13 (2): 141-164. 
[55] Marquez, Robert, 2002, “Competition, Adverse Selection, and Information 
Dispersion in Banking Industry”, Review of Financial Studies, 15 (3): 901-926. 
[56] Martins, António, Ana Serra and Vitorino Martins, 2011, “Real Estate Market Risk 
in Bank Stock Returns: Evidence for the EU-15 Countries”, working paper. 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1913731) 
[57] Martins, António, Ana Serra and Vitorino Martins, 2012, “The Residential Property 
Prices in EU-15: Importance of Institutional Factors”, mimeo. 
[58] Maudos Joaquín and Juan Guevara, 2004, “Factors Explaining the Interest Margin 
in the Banking Sectors of the European Union”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 28 (9): 2259-
81. 
[59] McShane, Rachael and Ian Sharpe, 1985, “A Time Series/Cross Section Analysis of 
the Determinants of Australian Trading Bank Loan/Deposit Interest Margin: 1962-1981”, 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 9: 115-136. 
[60] Murto, Risto, 1994, “Finnish Banking Crisis: Can We Blame Bank Management?” 
Finnish Economic Papers, 7, 1: 56-68. 
[61] Pensala, Johanna and Heikki Soltilla, 1993, “Banks’ Nonperforming Assets and 
Write-Offs in 1992”, Bank of Finland Discussion Papers 10/93. 
[62] Petersen, Mitchell and Raghuram Rajan, 1995, “The Effect of Credit Market 
Competition on Lending Relationships”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (2): 407-443.  
[63] Pezzuto, Ivo, 2008, “Miraculous Financial Engineering or Toxic Finance? The 
Genesis of the US Subprime Mortgage Loans Crisis and Its Consequences on the Global 
Financial Markets and Real Economy”, Swiss Management Center working paper 12/2008. 
[64] Poterba, James, 1991, “House Price Dynamics: The Role of Tax Policy and 
Demography”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2: 143-203. 
[65] Randall, Richard, 1993, “Lessons from New England Bank Failures”, New England 
Economic Review: 13-38. 
39 
 
[66] Salas, Vicente and Jesús Saurina, 2002, “Credit Risk in Two Institutional Regimes: 
Spanish Commercial and Savings Banks”, Journal of Financial Services Research, 22 (3): 203-
224. 
[67] Saunders, Anthony and Liliana Schumacher, 2000, “The Determinants of Banking 
Interest Margins: An International Study”, Journal of International Money and Finance, 19: 813-
832. 
[68] Simon, Herbert, 1978, “Rationality as Process and as Product of Thoughts”, 
American Economic Review, 68: 1-16. 
[69] Solttila, Heikki and Vesa Vihriälä, 1994, “Finnish Bank`s Problem Assets: Result of 
Unfortunate Asset Structure or Too Rapid Growth?” Bank of Finland Discussion Papers 
23/94. 
[70] Stevenson, Simon, 2008, “Modelling Housing Market Fundamentals: Empirical 
Evidence of Extreme Market Conditions”, Real Estate Economics, 36 (1): 1-29. 
[71] Stomper, Alex, 2006, “A Theory of Banks’ Industry Expertise, Market Power, and 
Credit Risk”, Management Science, 52 (10): 1618-1633. 
[72] The Economist, 2003, “House of Cards”, Survey of Property, 31 May: 3-16. 
[73] Tsatsaronis, Kostas and Haibin Zhu, 2004, “What Drives Housing Price Dynamics: 
Cross Country Evidence” BIS Quarterly Review, March. 
[74] Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman, 1982, Evidential Impact of Base Rates, in 
Kahneman, Daniel, Paul Slovic e Amos Tversky, Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases. 
[75] Valverde, Santiago and Francisco Fernández, 2007, “The Determinants of Bank 
Margins in European Banking”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 31: 2043-63. 
[76] Verik, Sher and Iyanatul Islam, 2010, “The Great Recession of 2008-2009: Causes, 
Consequences and Policy Responses”, IZA DP working paper n.º 4934. 
[77] Winton, Andrew, 1999, “Don’t Put All Your Eggs in One Basket? Diversification 
and Specialization in Lending”, working paper, University of Minnesota. 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=173615) 
[78] White, Brent, 2010, “Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear and the 
Social Management of Housing Crisis”, Arizona Legal Studies, Discussion Paper 09-35, 
University of Arizona. 
40 
 
[79] White, Brent, 2010, “Take this House and Shove it: The Emotional Drivers of 
Strategic Default”, Arizona Legal Studies, Discussion Paper 10-17, University of Arizona. 
41 
 
Table 1: Residential Housing Prices Series 
The table presents the sources of residential house price series with its description, source, prices type, dwelling type, geographical coverage and first observation. All these series were 
deflated using CPI. All series were obtained from Bank International Settlements (BIS): BIS House Prices. 
Country Dwelling Dwelling Type Geographical Coverage Prices Description of Index Period Source 
Germany 
Second Hand 
Dwellings. 
Property offering a good quality 
of life in average to good 
locations. 
Terraced houses and flats. 
Western Germany: Before 1989: 50 
towns/cities. 
From 1990 onwards: 100 towns/cities. 
From 1995 onwards: 125 towns/cities 
(100 towns/cities in Western Germany 
and 25 towns/cities in Eastern 
Germany) 
Typical values quantified 
by real estate experts who 
refer to price data of 
various types, including 
non-transaction prices. 
Prices weighted through population. 
Aggregation based on the share of terraced 
houses and flats in the total living área. 
1975 - 
Central Bank of Germany. 
Figures are based on data 
from BulwienGesa AG. 
(www.bundesbank.de) 
Austria 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
Houses and apartments. Vienna Transaction Prices. Weighted average price 1976  - 
Central Bank of Austria 
(www.oenb.at) 
Belgium 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
Small and medium sized 
dwellings for sale by mutual 
agreement. 
Nationwide Transaction Prices. 
Average price index weighted by the number of 
transactions for each type of housing. 
1988 - 
STADIM (private 
consultancy) 
(www.stadim.be) 
Denmark 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
Houses, flats and holiday homes. 
Nationwide (data collected at 
municipal level). 
Transaction Prices. 
Average price per square meter for 
municipalities weighted with the dwelling 
stock. 
1971 - 
Danish Mortgage 
Association 
(www.realkreditraadet.dk) 
Spain 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
All dwellings excluding those 
that have a market value over  
€1.050.000. 
Nationwide (data collected for 
provinces and municipalities with more 
than 25.000 inhabitants. 
Price is calculated by using 
official valuations: “Open 
market appraised housing” 
Average price per square meter weighted with 
the number of valuations.  
1987 - 
Ministry of Housing 
(www.fomento.gob.es) 
Finland 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
Houses and apartments. 
Large Cities (with more than 100.000 
inhabitants). 
Transaction Prices. 
Average price index weighted by the number of 
transactions for each type of housing. 
1978 - 
Central Bank of Finland 
(www.suomenpankki.fi) 
France 
Second Hand 
Dwellings. 
Second-hand dwellings: more 
than 5 years old or sold a second 
time within the 1st  
5 years. 
Paris. 
 
Nationwide. 
Transaction Prices. 
Paris: Average price per square meter observed 
in sales. 
 
Country: Hedonic regression. 
1980 - 
 
1994 - 
Notaires – INSEE 
(www.insee.fr) 
Greece 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
N/A Athens and 17 major cities.  Transaction Prices. 
Prices weighted with the dwelling stock (in 
square meters) in Athens and 17 major cities. 
1994 - 
Central Bank of Greece 
(www.bankofgreece.gr) 
Netherlands 
Second Hand 
Dwellings. 
Detached house, corner house, 
terraced house, apartment, semi-
detached house. 
Nationwide. Transaction Prices. Weighted repeat sales. 1976 - 
National Land Register 
(Kadaster) 
(www.kadaster.org) 
Ireland 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
All newly mortgaged residential 
property. 
Nationwide. 
Price at mortgage 
approval. 
Simple average of house price for new and 
second hand dwellings in the period in question. 
1971 - 
Department of the 
Environment 
(www.environ.ie) 
Italy 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
N/A 13 large urban areas. Transaction Prices. Weighted average price 1988 - 
NOMISMA 
(www.nomisma.it) 
Luxemburg 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
Flats and Houses. Nationwide. Transaction Prices. Laspeyere price indices. 1974 - 
Central Bank of 
Luxembourg  (www.bcl.lu) 
Portugal 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
Flats and Houses. Nationwide (exclude islands) 
Price is calculated by using 
official valuations. 
Weighted price indices by hedonic regression 
and by housing type. 
1988 - 
Imométrica 
(www1.ipd.com) 
UK 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
Detached house, semi-detached 
house, bungalow, terraced house 
and flats. 
Nationwide. Transaction Prices. Mixed Adjusted 1969 - 
Department of Communities 
and Local Government 
(www.communities.gov.uk) 
Sweden 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
One and two dwelling buildings. Nacional N/A 
Weighted average of the price indices of owner-
occupied adjusted for ratable values and based 
on the legal registration. 
1986 - 
Statistics Sweden 
(www.scb.se/) 
42 
 
 
Table 2: Determinants of Bank Credit Risk: Variable Definition and Expected Relationships 
Variable Variable Definition 
Coefficient 
Sign 
RISKit-1 Ratio of loan loss provision to net loans from the previous period (RISK). The current ratio is closely related to that of the previous 
period, since loan loss provisions are not immediately written down in the bank balance sheet.  
Positive 
GDPt-h Real GDP Growth Rate. Measures the impact of aggregated economic activity. The larger the economic growth the lower the degree of 
default by economic agents.  
Negative 
DFAMt 
Ratio Between the Liabilities of Families and the GDP. This ratio measures the families’ indebtedness level.  
Positive 
DEMPt 
Ratio Between the Liabilities of Company and GDP. This ratio measures the company’s indebtedness level.  
Positive 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-h 
Ratio between Total Credit and Total Assets lagged one, two and three periods. A target of rapid increase in market share can force the 
bank to reduce the quality of its borrowers. However, since the loan is granted till it becomes a provision loans, there is a lag unknown 
and variable. In order to measure the temporal effects, we allow three lags, starting at t-1. If it were lagged less are than one period, it 
could be spuriously correlated with the dependent variable through the denominator.  
Positive 
INEFit Level of Bank Inefficiencies provided by the ratio “Operating Costs to Gross Income”. A higher value for the ratio indicates that there are 
management inefficiencies. It is expected that banks with better management in place have a lower level of loan provisions. 
Positive 
SIZEit 
Bank’s Relative Dimension provided by the ratio between bank assets i and total bank assets, during the period t. As we noted in section 
2.2.2.1, some authors use this variable to measure risk diversification policies. A big balance sheet allows the managers to invest in 
different geographical or business segments to deal with asymmetric shocks. If the relative size is a good proxy for risk diversification, we 
should find a negative coefficient. On the other hand, this variable may capture the bank’s market power. In this situation, we should 
expected a positive sign for the coefficient, because when the bank increases the market power, increase the probability of granting credit 
to companies with a higher credit risk. 
Positive or 
Negative 
MARGINit-h 
Bank Interest Margin obtained by the variable “Net Interest Margin”, lagged two and three periods. This variable is a measure of the 
difference between the interest income generated by banks and the amount of interest paid to their lenders (for example, deposits), 
relative to the amount of their (interest-earning) assets. It is similar to the gross margin of non-financial companies. The present variable 
not only reflects the profitability of bank credit, but also incorporates a risk premium. The increased risk will tend to provoke an increase 
in the gross margin, for which reason the variables are lagged.  
Positive 
EQUITYit-h 
Solvency Ratio is provided by the ratio between Capital and Total Assets, lagged two and three periods. The impact of solvency 
difficulties is not straightforward. The loans provisions will appear later because it takes time to change credit policy. The higher the 
solvency ratio, the lower the incentives to take more risks. Therefore, a negative coefficient is expected for the coefficient. Nevertheless, 
lower capital ratios may induce banks to “gamble for resurrection”, thereby causing the opposite impacts on bank decisions.  
Positive or 
Negative 
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Table 2: Determinants of Bank Credit Risk: Variable Definition and Expected Relationships (cont.) 
Variable Variable Definition 
Coefficient 
Sign 
PREMit-3 
Credit Risk Premium. The higher ex post credit risk may be anticipated by the bank charging an ex ante risk premium in the interest of the 
loans. To control for this effect, we include PREMit-3 (the difference between interest income over total assets and the interbank interest 
rate) as a proxy for the risk premium. The tree-year lags is designed to catch the ex ante component of risk premium. If the riskier loans are 
properly priced, the coefficient associated to the variable should be positive and statistically significant. However, it is possible that a 
positive impact may not be found if strong competition induces cross-subsidization of products inside banks.  
Positive 
RMShareit 
The weight of residential mortgage loans in the bank’s assets. 
? 
RPPRICEt-1 The rate of growth in real terms of the residential housing prices in the country (or in the region, for those banks whose exposure to the real 
estate market is at a regional level). Detailed information about residential housing price series appears in table 1. 
? 
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Table 3: Determinants of Bank Profitability: Variable Definition and Expected Relationships 
Variable Variable Definition 
Coefficient 
Sign 
MARGINIt-1 
Bank Interest Margin from the previous period.  
Positive 
GDPt-h 
Real GDP growth rate. The relationship between the bank margins and growth will depend on the correlation between prices, costs and 
the business cycle. Economic growth is negatively related to bank prices and costs, although the extent to which these variables are 
affected may be significantly different, meaning that the net effect on margin may not be clearly determined (Carbó et al., 2003).  
Positive or 
Negative 
BBMBt 
Bank-Based or Market-Based System. A dummy variable is used in order to show the potential effects of the differences in the bank 
margins according to the structure of the financial system. The dummy take the value 1 if the bank operates in a bank-based system and 
the value 0 if bank operates in a market-based system. Valverde and Fernández (2007) found positive and negative signs, statistically 
significant, for this proxy. 
Positive or 
Negative 
RISKit-h 
Credit Risk defined by the value of the ratio “Loan Loss Provisions to Net Loans” lagged into two and three periods. The values of this ratio 
are lagged since risk parameters are not expected to affect margins contemporaneously. A greater risk premium should be required by the 
bank when the credit risk increases. 
Positive 
LIQit-h Liquidity risk provided by the ratio “Liquid Assets to Short Term Funding”. The risk of insufficient liquidity may force banks to request 
emergency funds at excessive cost. Angbazo (1997) states that the liquidity risk tends to affect bank margin positively. 
Positive 
SDR3M it-h 
Volatility of the Market Interest Rate is used as the proxy for the interest rate risk. The uncertainty in the money market is reflected in the 
theoretical model by the variance of the market interest rate. The empirical proxy for this variable is consequently based on a 
measurement of volatility of the market interest rate, such as the annual standard deviation of the daily interbank interest rate at 3 
months. The variable is lagged since the volatility of the market interest rate is not expected to affect the gross margin 
contemporaneously. It is expected that the interest rate risk increases banks’ gross margin (Saunders and Schumacher, 2000).  
Positive 
HHIt 
Herfindahl and Hirschman Index computed from banks total assets on the domestic market. In theory, the level of concentration of 
banking activity and banks’ gross margins tend to be positively related. However, this relationship may be influenced by third variables 
and the gross margins can be negatively affected by market concentration (see for example, Cetorelli and Gambera, 2002). The HHI 
variable was obtained from two reports from the European Central Bank (ECB, 2005 and 2010). 
Positive or 
Negative 
INEFit 
Level of Bank Inefficiencies provided by the “Cost to Income Ratio”. The existence of high operating costs implies increased operating 
inefficiency. Therefore, we expect those banks experiencing higher costs to increase prices to a greater extent (if they enjoy market 
power), so that inefficiency will result in higher margins (Altunbas et al., 2001). Maudos and Guevara (2004) state that this proxy may, 
alternatively, indicate the quality or efficiency of the management. There tends to be higher quality management when there is a lucrative 
composition of assets and a low cost composition of liabilities. Thus a higher ratio would imply lesser management efficiency or quality, 
which would reflect lower gross margins. 
Positive or 
Negative 
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Table 3: Determinants of Bank Profitability: Variable Definition and Expected Relationships (cont.) 
Variable Variable Definition 
Coefficient 
Sign 
ΔLOANit 
Average Dimension of Operations or Credit Volume. In the estimation we use the loans growth rate as proxy. In the model developed by 
Maudos and Guevara (2004), the gross margins are a growing function of the average dimension of the operations realized. The reason 
for this is that for a certain risk value and market risk, a large operation will tend to involve greater risk of potential loss, so the bank will 
tend to require a greater margin. Thus, the potential loss will tend to be greater for banks with a high volume of credit volume. Davis and 
Zhu (2009) refers that if the bank’s risk attitude remains the same across the credit cycle, its profitability should be higher as a 
compensation for the higher credit risk. Nevertheless, if the risk-taking behaviour is associated with distorted incentives, such as the 
“disaster myopia” tendency mentioned before, its linkage with bank profitability is more ambiguous. 
Positive or 
Negative 
EQUITYit-h 
Solvency Ratio provided by “Capital to Assets Ratio”. Valverde and Fernández (2007) state that debt substitution for capital, lower the 
bank’s insolvency risk and possibly decrease the funding costs for the bank. But as the capital is becoming a more costly source of 
funding, an increase in equity tends to increase the average cost of the capital. Thus, a higher gross margin will tend to be required ex-ante. 
Davis and Zhu (2009) state that the solvency ratio may have two opposite effects on bank profitability. If the cost-of-funding effect 
dominates, a higher equity ratio leads to higher bank profitability. If the “gamble for resurrection” effect dominates instead, banks with lower 
capitalisation will invest more on high-risk assets and the loan quality is impaired. 
Positive or 
Negative 
IPPit 
Implicit Interest Payments. Following Ho and Saunders (1981), Angbazo (1997) and Saunders and Schumacher (2000), the proxy “(Non-
Interest Expenses – Non-Interest Revenues)/Total Assets” is used to measure the implicit interest payments. This variable reflects extra 
payments to depositors through service charge remission or other types of transfers due to competition in the market for deposits. These 
extra interest expenses should be mirrored in higher interest margins. 
Positive 
RPPRICEit-1 
Rate of growth in real terms of the residential housing prices in the country (or in the region, for those banks whose exposure to the real 
estate market is at a regional level) or the accumulated rate of growth in real terms of residential housing prices. Detailed information 
about residential housing price series appears in table 1. 
? 
RMShareit The weight of residential mortgage loans in the bank’s assets. ? 
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Table 4: Distribution of Banks by Country and Specialization 
This table shows the banks distribution by country and specialization. The sample was obtained from the database 
BANKSCOPE. We only consider banks with more than three consecutive years of observations between 1995 and 
2008. The banks’ specialization is in agreement with the classification used by database BANKSCOPE. The 
specialization category “Others” includes: “Bank Holdings & Holding Companies”, “Savings Banks” and 
“Investment Banks”. 
Country 
Number of Banks 
Commercial Cooperative 
Real Estate & 
Mortgage 
Others Total 
Germany 28 6 3 10 47 
Austria 16 9 5 10 40 
Belgium 8 1 0 5 14 
Denmark 40 0 2 12 54 
Spain1 22 5 0 43 70 
Finland 5 0 0 1 6 
France 37 50 3 5 95 
Greece  13 0 0 1 14 
Netherlands 18 1 1 6 26 
Ireland 11 0 3 1 15 
Italy 27 16 0 17 60 
Luxemburg 11 1 0 2 14 
Portugal  7 1 1 9 18 
United Kingdom 24 0 34 8 66 
Sweden 5 0 4 7 16 
Total 272 90 56 137 555 
1 
The column relating to “Others” has only Saving Banks given the importance of the Cajas de Ahorros in 
Spain. 
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the 555 European Banks in the period between 1999 and 2008. 
RISK is the ratio of provisions for loan losses and the total net loans; GDP is the real GDP growth; DFAM 
is the ratio between the liabilities of families and the GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities of firms 
and GDP; LOAN_TO_ASSETS is the ratio of total loans to total assets; INEF is the ratio of operating 
costs to gross income; SIZE is the ratio between bank assets i and the total bank assets; MARGIN is the 
proxy for bank profitability measured by net interest margin (gross margin); EQUITY is the ratio between 
the capital and total assets; PREM is obtained from the difference between interest income over total assets 
and the interbank interest rate; LIQ is the ratio net loans to short term funding; SDR3M is the annual 
standard deviation of the daily interbank 3 month interest rate; HH is the Herfindahl e Hirschman Index 
obtained via total assets on the domestic market (the ratio was obtained from the ECB and range between 0 
and 10.000); IPP is the ratio non-interest expenses – non-interest revenues)/total assets; ΔLOAN is the 
loans growth rate; RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets; 
RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of the residential housing market prices. 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  
Minimum Maximum  
RISK (%) 0,662 2,834 -2,297 35,353 
GDP (%) 2,001 1,469 -3,000 6,500 
DFAM (%) 72,871 27,989 24,240 148,280 
DEMP (%) 201,861 49,795 90,230 379,400 
LOAN_TO_ASSETS  59,055 22,824 0,523 99,130 
INEF (%) 62,783 30,818 0,000 254,050 
SIZE (%) 2,281 6,472 0,000 58,183 
MARGIN (%) 2,613 10,533 -2,870 13,230 
EQUITY (%) 8,317 6,745 -0,465 99,591 
PREM (%) 1,890 13,444 -5,269 12,992 
LIQ (%) 84,894 5,400 0,000 320,084 
SDR3M 0,411 0,527 0,888 0,023 
HH 685,148 489,445 158,00 3160,00 
IPP (%) 1,187 15,862 -6,972 2,820 
ΔLOAN (%) 14,612 13,044 -37,672 54,000 
RMSHARE (%) 30,943 21,234 0,000 99,443 
RPPRICE (%) 4,841 6,590 -14,742 23,222 
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics by Countries 
This table shows the descriptive statistics: mean and standard deviation by countries, in the period between 1999 and 2008. RISK is the ratio of provisions for loan losses and the total net loans; 
GDP is the real GDP growth; DFAM is the ratio between the liabilities of families and the GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities of firms and GDP; LOAN_TO_ASSETS is the ratio of 
total loans to total assets; INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross income; SIZE is the ratio between bank assets i and the total bank assets; MARGIN is the proxy for bank profitability 
measured by net interest margin (gross margin); EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; PREM is obtained from the difference between interest income over total assets and the 
interbank interest rate; LIQ is the ratio net loans to short term funding; SDR3M is the annual standard deviation of the daily interbank 3 month interest rate; HH is the Herfindahl e Hirschman 
Index obtained via total assets on the domestic market (the ratio was obtained from the ECB and range between 0 and 10.000); IPP is the ratio non-interest expenses – non-interest revenues)/total 
assets; ΔLOAN is the loans growth rate; RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of the residential housing 
market prices. The table reports the mean and standard deviation for each variable and country. The standard deviation comes in brackets. 
 GER AUT BEL DEN SPA FIN FRA GRE NET IRL ITA LUX POR UK SWE 
RISK (%) 0,441 
(3,30) 
0,853 
(6,04) 
0,210 
(0,62) 
0,657 
(0,99) 
0,494 
(0,28) 
0,093 
(0,21) 
0,467 
(2,00) 
1,317 
(1,90) 
1,760 
(7,14) 
0,244 
(0,57) 
0,686 
(1,06) 
0,123 
(0,038) 
0,750 
(0,90) 
0,384 
(1,40) 
0,549 
(5,26) 
GDP (%) 1,172 
(1,03) 
2,095 
(1,06) 
1,927 
(0,95) 
1,270 
(1,30) 
3,107 
(0,91) 
3,175 
(1,24) 
1,647 
(0,69) 
3,764 
(1,35) 
1,991 
(1,17) 
4,509 
(3,02) 
0,824 
(1,02) 
3,927 
(2,18) 
0,879 
(0,90) 
2,329 
(0,75) 
2,320 
(1,44) 
DFAM (%) 
69,159 
(3,89) 
51,522 
(2,58) 
43,030 
(4,01) 
125,740 
(13,42) 
74,136 
(12,19) 
46,452 
(9,15) 
55,712 
(5,80) 
40,782 
(12,13) 
109,062 
(11,06) 
82,717 
(21,04) 
38,852 
(5,66)) 
55,554 
(5,84) 
93,025 
(9,41) 
97,738 
(10,08) 
68,591 
(6,58) 
DEMP (%) 169,207 
(9,50) 
153,853 
(24,34) 
240,480 
(31,89) 
172,505 
(23,11) 
200,300 
(29,65) 
213,366 
(19,22) 
205,644 
(25,19) 
107,190 
(13,67) 
239,409 
(15,10) 
278,896 
(26,49) 
146,100 
(8,47) 
317,992 
(34,70) 
241,243 
(9,30) 
253,201 
(19,79) 
264,141 
(26,80) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETS 0,479 
(0,235) 
0,554 
(0,194) 
0,420 
(0,201) 
0,650 
(0,107) 
0,679 
(0,150) 
0,563 
(0,262) 
0,586 
(0,259) 
0,612 
(0,150) 
0,495 
(0,278) 
0,527 
(0,249) 
0,611 
(0,225) 
0,308 
(0,163) 
0,583 
(0,229) 
0,662 
(0,203) 
0,672 
(0,277) 
INEF (%) 72,971 
(32,29) 
66,592 
(31,87) 
64,568 
(18,93) 
58,308 
(16,53) 
60,184 
(31,06) 
67,547 
(18,66) 
63,525 
(28,63) 
71,475 
(36,21) 
63,553 
(34,44) 
63,505 
(18,39) 
45,31 
(44,18) 
54,415 
(23,10) 
61,305 
(13,80) 
62,985 
(17,88) 
55,020 
(29,26) 
SIZE (%) 0,893 
(2,42) 
2,897 
(5,02) 
11,991 
(17,98) 
1,519 
(5,20) 
1,413 
(4,01) 
16,002 
(27,90) 
1,203 
(3,59) 
5,929 
(6,74) 
2,672 
(6,24) 
2,584 
(3,24) 
0,975 
(3,25) 
4,723 
(4,38) 
4,184 
(5,75) 
0,682 
(1,71) 
7,054 
(10,84) 
MARGIN (%) 6,573 
(35,66) 
1,892 
(1,31) 
1,749 
(1,56) 
3,763 
(1,66) 
2,305 
(0,81) 
2,035 
(1,18) 
1,950 
(1,37) 
2,921 
(1,03) 
1,478 
(0,99) 
1,256 
(0,77) 
2,769 
(1,33) 
0,959 
(0,53) 
2,477 
(1,30) 
1,997 
(1,82) 
1,563 
(1,05) 
EQUITY (%) 6,581 
(8,92) 
7,525 
(9,93) 
5,279 
(2,59) 
11,917 
(4,99) 
7,907 
(3,56) 
7,158 
(2,89) 
8,907 
(4,76) 
8,715 
(6,51) 
6,476 
(3,55) 
5,184 
(2,89) 
9,978 
(6,24) 
5,253 
(2,36) 
8,417 
(8,21) 
7,859 
(9,18) 
8,460 
(8,69) 
PREM (%) 2,350 
(5,29) 
1,798 
(2,17) 
2,132 
(3,61) 
2,021 
(1,52) 
1,175 
(1,11) 
0,245 
(1,34) 
1,810 
(1,66) 
2,303 
(1,47) 
1,765 
(3,39) 
1,006 
(1,61) 
1,823 
(3,36) 
3,930 
(3,82) 
2,216 
(1,97) 
2,413 
(37,99) 
0,951 
(1,35) 
LIQ (%) 70,603 
(5,45) 
100,21 
(8,24) 
59,634 
(2,93) 
133,24 
(2,90) 
92,96 
(3,13) 
80,64 
(3,84) 
132,55 
(4,92) 
72,56 
(2,46) 
135,11 
(2,35) 
84,65 
(4,06) 
120,23 
(9,46) 
41,58 
(2,57) 
85,69 
(3,47) 
93,97 
(7,94) 
179,31 
(2,14) 
SDR3M 0,295 
(0,17) 
0,304 
(0,18) 
0,299 
(0,17) 
0,301 
(0,17) 
1,100 
(1,18) 
0,299 
(0,18) 
0,304 
(0,18) 
0,296 
(0,17) 
0,285 
(0,16) 
0,295 
(0,17) 
0,295 
(0,17) 
0,289 
(0,18) 
0,296 
(0,17) 
0,384 
(0,24) 
0,346 
(0,16) 
HH 174,75 
(9,85) 
545,37 
(42,97) 
1971,00 
(167,74) 
1132,37 
(42,50) 
496,00 
(34,12) 
2547,50 
(316,47) 
648,75 
(60,00) 
1117,75 
(33,24) 
1841,75 
(136,60) 
597,87 
(81,96) 
265,25 
(43,86) 
293,75 
(15,10) 
1073,75 
(64,16) 
370,75 
(52,12) 
845,25 
(67,58) 
IPP (%) 2,423 
(36,1) 
0,912 
(2,3) 
0,423 
(1,1) 
1,422 
(1,2) 
1,323 
(5,2) 
0,523 
(1,2) 
0,323 
(3,2) 
1,623 
(2,2) 
0,523 
(1,2) 
0,223 
(1,6) 
1,723 
(13,1) 
0,156 
(1,4) 
0,934 
(1,6) 
0,534 
(30,4) 
0,223 
(3,2) 
ΔLOAN (%) 7,221 
(57,8) 
11,767 
(20,85) 
9,208 
(31,7) 
16,101 
(15,93) 
31,239 
(29,53) 
15,329 
(51,7) 
12,719 
(65,0) 
38,086 
(23,5) 
36,167 
(54,8) 
23,905 
(69,9) 
25,373 
(63,3) 
12,651 
(25,7) 
22,206 
(46,4) 
6,254 
(22,8) 
23,940 
(62,2) 
RMSHARE (%) 20,032 
(17,0) 
20,902 
(11,1) 
16,932 
(10,8) 
27,923 
(14,2) 
35,623 
(15,2) 
29,734 
(21,2) 
29,821 
(18,3) 
23,523 
(11,2) 
24,232 
(23,2) 
32,321 
(26,2) 
26,823 
(15,2) 
11,012 
(8,3) 
26,121 
(15,2) 
34,523 
(28,2) 
31,623 
(26,9) 
RPPRICE (%) 0,318 
(0,70) 
1,903 
(4,93) 
7,373 
(3,09) 
5,271 
(8,11) 
7,472 
(6,14) 
5,510 
(8,20) 
7,296 
(6,60) 
4,536 
(4,76) 
2,568 
(1,05) 
4,210 
(6,90) 
5,188 
(2,01) 
6,316 
(4,55) 
-2,255 
(2,16) 
4,791 
(10,12) 
5,618 
(4,11) 
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Table 7: Determinants of Banks’ Risk: Dynamic Panel Analysis 
Panel A: Total Sample 
This table reports the estimation results of six regressions based on equation (4). The dependent variable RISK is the 
ratio of provisions for loan losses and the total net loans and is used as a proxy of the bank’s credit risk. This variable 
appears transformed (dependent variable ln(RISKit/(1-RISKit)). GDP is the real GDP growth; DFAM is the ratio 
between the liabilities of families and the GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities of firms and GDP; 
LOAN_TO_ASSETS is the ratio of total loans to total assets; INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross income; 
SIZE is the ratio between bank assets i and the total bank assets; MARGIN is the proxy for bank profitability 
measured by net interest margin (gross margin); EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; PREM is 
obtained from the difference between interest income over total assets and the interbank interest rate; RMSHARE 
is the weight of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of 
the residential housing market prices (or region, in the case of regression VI, for banks with regional or international 
exposure to the housing market). LTV is the average loan to value ratio in the country where the bank operates.  We 
use the Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano e Bond, 1991) and GMM estimation procedure. t statistics are presented in 
brackets. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Variables I II    III         IV V VI 
RISKit-1 0,3165
a 
(10,63) 
 0,3333a 
    (10,95) 
0,3354a 
(10,57) 
0,2205a 
(7,94) 
0,2258a 
(7,89) 
0,1224b 
(2,02) 
GDPt -0,0495
a 
(-9,77) 
-0,0468a 
     (-9,24) 
-0,0459a 
(-8,84) 
-0,0303a 
(-5,82) 
-0,0297a 
(-5,66) 
-0,0637a 
(-6,88) 
GDPt-1 -0,0327
a 
(-6,97) 
-0,0354a 
     (-7,36) 
-0,0347a 
(-7,21) 
-0,0295a 
(-6,04) 
-0,0292a 
(-5,96) 
-0,0417a 
(-4,84) 
DFAMt 0,0067
a 
(4,93) 
 0,0058a 
    (4,32) 
0,0049a 
(3,67) 
0,0121a 
(5,02) 
0,0121a 
(5,01) 
0,0053b 
(2,24) 
DEMPt -0,0004 
(-1,26) 
-0,0004 
     (-1,20) 
-0,0003 
(-0,86) 
-0,0012a 
(-3,71) 
-0,0011a 
(-3,33) 
-0,0007c 
(-1,75) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-1 0,7091
a 
(4,84) 
 0,7279a 
     (4,93) 
0,7461a 
(4,91) 
0,6380a 
(4,63) 
0,6371a 
(4,44) 
0,1751b 
(2,01) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-2 -0,0244 
(-0,26) 
-0,0379 
     (-0,40) 
-0,0653 
(-0,67) 
-0,0021 
(-0,02) 
-0,0233 
(-0,24) 
0,0690 
(1,49) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-3 -0,0643 
(-0,62) 
-0,0701 
     (-0,67) 
-0,1030 
(-0,96) 
0,0143 
(0,12) 
-0,0168 
(-0,14) 
0,1370c 
(1,71) 
INEFit 0,0006 
(1,31) 
  0,0005 
     (1,03) 
0,0005 
(1,02) 
0,0000 
(0,97) 
0,0000 
(0,91) 
0,0007 
(1,37) 
SIZEit -2,4212
a 
(-3,93) 
-2,4531a 
     (-3,88) 
-2,4623a 
(-4,38) 
-2,6112a 
(-3,91) 
-2,6558a 
(-4,25) 
-2,5698a 
(-4,09) 
MARGINit-2 0,0721
c 
(1,89) 
 0,0697c 
     (1,80) 
0,0636c 
(1,77) 
0,1007b 
(2,22) 
0,0966b 
(2,01) 
0,0017b 
(2,18) 
MARGINit-3 0,0698 
(0,71) 
 0,0740 
     (0,74) 
0,1158 
(1,11) 
-0,0468 
(-0,40) 
-0,0425 
(-0,34) 
-0,0043 
(-1,17) 
EQUITYit-2 0,0620 
(0,20) 
 0,0741 
      (0,24) 
0,0125 
(0,04) 
-0,0943 
(-0,33) 
-0,1372 
(-0,46) 
0,2099 
(0,50) 
EQUITYit-3 0,2368 
(0,86) 
 0,1576 
      (0,56) 
0,0303 
(0,10) 
-0,0995 
(-0,31) 
-0,2562 
(-0,76) 
0,3654 
(0,37) 
PREMit-3 -0,2104 
(-0,36) 
-0,2395 
     (-0,41) 
-0,4852 
(-0,79) 
0,2245 
(0,41) 
0,1056 
(0,18) 
0,0278 
(1,33) 
RMSHAREit -1,0151
a 
(-4,73) 
-0,9584a 
    (-4,52) 
 -0,8733a 
(-4,22) 
 -1,2310a 
(-4,80) 
RPPRICEt-1 
  -0,0015c 
(-1,71) 
 -0,0016c 
(-1,80) 
 
RMSHAREit*RPPRICEt-1  -0,0072
a 
     (-3,53) 
-0,0098a 
(-4,69) 
-0,0067a 
(-3,40) 
-0,0082a 
(-4,04) 
-0,0069a 
      (-2,82) 
LTVt    0,0876
a 
(8,36) 
0,0842a 
(7,90) 
 
Time Period 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008     1999-2008 1999-2008 
# Observations 4540     4540 4540 4540   4540 4540 
Sargan Test (p-value) 0,235     0,245 0,267 0,289   0,278 0,253 
AR (1) and p-value -3,3a (0,00)  -2,9a (0,00) -2,7a (0,00) -2,8a (0,00)   -2,1b (0,03)  -2,0b (0,04) 
AR (2) and p-value -0,4  (0,75)   0,4 (0,80) -1,3  (0,20) -0,5  (0,67)   -1,1  (0,29)  -0,9  (0,21) 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects No No No No No No 
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Table 7: Determinants of Banks’ Risk: Dynamic Panel Analysis (cont.) 
Panel B: Subsamples 
This table reports the estimation results of four regressions based on equation (4), for subsamples. We use the 
Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano e Bond, 1991) and GMM procedure. The dependent variable RISK is the ratio of 
provisions for loan losses and the total net loans and is used as a proxy of the bank’s credit risk. This variable 
appears transformed (dependent variable ln(RISKit/(1-RISKit)). GDP is the real GDP growth; DFAM is the ratio 
between the liabilities of families and the GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities of firms and GDP; 
LOAN_TO_ASSETS is the ratio of total loans to total assets; INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross income; 
SIZE is the ratio between bank assets i and the total bank assets; MARGIN is the proxy for bank profitability 
measured by net interest margin (gross margin); EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; PREM is 
obtained from the difference between interest income over total assets and the interbank interest rate; RMSHARE 
is the weight of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of 
the domestic residential housing market prices. 
Regression VII includes the banks of Germany and Austria. Regression VIII includes de banks of Spain, Ireland and 
UK. Regressions IX and X are estimated for the first quartile and fourth quartile, according to the weight of 
residential mortgage loans in total loans, respectively. t statistics are presented in brackets. a, b and c denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Variables VII VIII         IX X 
RISKit-1 0,4341
a 
(11,60) 
0,2439a 
(11,75) 
0,1837a 
(4,27) 
0,4509a 
(20,00) 
GDPt -0,0875
a 
(-7,27) 
-0,0778a 
(-9,49) 
-0,0543a 
(-5,10) 
-0,0512a 
(-7,13) 
GDPt-1 -0,0874
a 
(-6,41) 
-0,0152 
(-1,56) 
-0,0340a 
(-3,01) 
-0,0020 
(-0,33) 
DFAMt 0,0492
a 
(8,54) 
0,0049a 
(2,96) 
0,0149a 
(4,37) 
0,0044b 
(2,31) 
DEMPt 0,0113
 
(1,36) 
-0,0015a 
(-2,96) 
-0,0005 
(-0,74) 
-0,0013a 
(-3,10) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-1 0,8430
a 
(4,37) 
0,8647a 
(5,70) 
0,5518c 
(1,89) 
0,3908a 
(2,64) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-2 -0,4459
b 
(-2,21) 
0,2384c 
(1,66) 
-0,2113 
(-1,60) 
0,0321 
(0,16) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-3 -0,1108 
(-0,39) 
0,1291 
(0,69) 
0,1410 
(0,84) 
0,3452b 
(2,14) 
INEFit 0,0013 
(1,15) 
0,0008 
(1,06) 
0,0004 
(0,64) 
0,0028a 
(3,17) 
SIZEit -4,4392
a 
(-3,36) 
-4,271a 
(-2,82) 
-3,2162 
(-1,49) 
-2,6558a 
(-4,25) 
MARGINit-2 0,1037
 
(1,18) 
0,0556 
(0,27) 
0,1401b 
(2,53) 
-0,2973 
(-1,25) 
MARGINit-3 0,2212
c 
(1,69) 
1,7370c 
(1,93) 
-0,1157 
(-0,69) 
-0,2420 
(1,19) 
EQUITYit-2 -0,3141 
(-0,47) 
0,4977 
(0,84) 
0,6365c 
(1,65) 
-0,6511 
(-1,15) 
EQUITYit-3 -0,7999
c 
(-1,66) 
-0,0146 
(-0,02) 
0,0960 
(0,23) 
0,3852 
(1,029) 
PREMit-3 0,0129
c 
(1,67) 
-0,0207a 
(-3,68) 
0,0116 
(1,18) 
0,0254a 
(4,26) 
RMSHAREit -1,5913
a 
(-3,53) 
-0,6654b 
(-2,37) 
-4,1373a 
(-3,44) 
-0,3863b 
(2,44) 
RMSHAREit * RPPRICEt-1 0,0557
a 
(4,44) 
-0,0125a 
(-5,90) 
-0,0385b 
(-2,03) 
-0,0106a 
(-6,50) 
Time Period 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 
# Observations 688 1273 1011 1081 
Sargan Test (p-value) 0,158 0,132 0,395 0,167 
AR (1) and p-value   -5,5a  (0,00)  -2,3b   (0,01)  -2,9a  (0,00)  -3,1a (0,00) 
AR (2) and p-value   -0,3   (0,78)   0,1    (0,90)   0,3   (0,75)  -0,2   (0,81) 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects No No No No 
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Table 7: Determinants of Banks’ Risk: Dynamic Panel Analysis (cont.) 
Panel C: Total Sample and Time Fixed Effects 
This table reports the estimation results of six regressions based on equation (4) with time fixed effects. The 
dependent variable RISK is the ratio of provisions for loan losses and the total net loans and is used as a proxy of 
the bank’s credit risk. This variable appears transformed (dependent variable ln(RISK it/(1-RISKit)). GDP is the real 
GDP growth; DFAM is the ratio between the liabilities of families and the GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the 
liabilities of firms and GDP; LOAN_TO_ASSETS is the ratio of total loans to total assets; INEF is the ratio of 
operating costs to gross income; SIZE is the ratio between bank assets i and the total bank assets; MARGIN is the 
proxy for bank profitability measured by net interest margin (gross margin); EQUITY is the ratio between the 
capital and total assets; PREM is obtained from the difference between interest income over total assets and the 
interbank interest rate; RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets; RPPRICE is 
the rate of growth in real terms of the residential housing market prices (or region, in the case of regression VI, for 
banks with regional or international exposure to the housing market). LTV is the average loan to value ratio in the 
country where the bank operates.  We use the Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano e Bond, 1991) and GMM 
estimation procedure. t statistics are presented in brackets. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively.  
Variables XI XII    XIII         XIV XV XVI 
RISKit-1 0,0768
c 
(1,75) 
0,0765c 
(1,73) 
0,0801c 
(1,81) 
0,1915a 
(3,06) 
0,2229a 
(3,89) 
0,1063c 
(1,98) 
GDPt -0,0464
a 
(-4,27) 
-0,0463a 
(-4,25) 
-0,0624a 
(-5,11) 
-0,0311a 
(-3,30) 
-0,0582a 
(-8,73) 
-0,0526a 
(-4,46) 
GDPt-1 -0,0373
a 
(-3,60) 
-0,0373a 
(-3,59) 
-0,0371a 
(-3,38) 
-0,0280a 
(-3,01) 
-0,0335a 
(-6,29) 
-0,0425a 
(-4,02) 
DFAMt 0,0066
b 
(2,04) 
0,0066b 
(2,02) 
0,0091a 
(2,86) 
0,0107a 
(3,66) 
0,0103a 
(3,45) 
0,0068b 
(1,99) 
DEMPt 0,0006 
(1,08) 
0,0006 
(1,04) 
0,0006 
(1,03) 
-0,0010a 
(-2,88) 
-0,0008a 
(-4,17) 
0,0006 
(0,98) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-1 0,1099
b 
(2,63) 
0,1058b 
(2,52) 
0,1285a 
(2,88) 
0,3573a 
(2,91) 
0,3992a 
(2,87) 
0,1049c 
(1,87) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-2 0,0790 
(0,68) 
0,0782 
(0,68) 
0,0637 
(0,47) 
-0,3213b 
(-2,26) 
-0,3235b 
(-2,17) 
-0,0285 
(-0,29) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-3 0,1001 
(0,63) 
0,1001 
(0,64) 
0,0777 
(0,45) 
0,1009 
(0,99) 
0,0743 
(0,72) 
0,0468 
(0,31) 
INEFit 0,0006 
(1,13) 
0,0006 
(1,13) 
0,0008 
(1,57) 
0,0006 
(1,24) 
0,0003 
(0,82) 
0,0006 
(1,02) 
SIZEit -2,7257
a 
(-3,63) 
-2,7249a 
(-3,62) 
-3,1320a 
(-4,92) 
-2,2740a 
(-3,07) 
-2,2731a 
(-3,08) 
-2,4447a 
(-3,89) 
MARGINit-2 0,0019
b 
(2,46) 
0,0019b 
(2,46) 
0,0017c 
(1,80) 
0,0020a 
(3,78) 
0,0017a 
(3,18) 
0,0017c 
(1,87) 
MARGINit-3 -0,0055 
(-1,36) 
-0,0055 
(-1,35) 
-0,0053 
(-1,21) 
-0,0014 
(-1,01) 
-0,0011 
(-0,90) 
-0,0062 
(-1,39) 
EQUITYit-2 0,3347 
(0,80) 
0,3324 
(0,79) 
0,4216 
(0,99) 
-0,1399 
(-0,46) 
-0,1755 
(-0,54) 
0,2768 
(0,64) 
EQUITYit-3 0,4914 
(1,24) 
0,4939 
(1,24) 
0,6149 
(1,43) 
-0,0878 
(-0,32) 
-0,1335 
(-0,46) 
0,4805 
(1,19) 
PREMit-3 0,0347 
(1,52) 
0,0347 
(1,51) 
0,0326 
(1,28) 
0,0096 
(0,52) 
0,0036 
(0,58) 
0,0357 
(1,54) 
RMSHAREit -1,4450
a 
(-5,45) 
-1,4388a 
(-5,41) 
 -0,8446a 
(-5,38) 
 -1,5299a 
(-5,85) 
RPPRICEt-1 
  -0,0524c 
(-1,90) 
 -0,0041c 
(-1,86) 
 
RMSHAREit*RPPRICEt-1  -0,0086
a 
     (-2,86) 
-0,0094a 
(-1,94) 
-0,0093a 
(-3,58) 
-0,0156a 
(-3,31) 
-0,0067a 
(-2,75) 
LTVt    0,1028
b 
(1,99) 
0,1022c 
(1,74) 
 
Time Period 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008     1999-2008 1999-2008 
# Observations 4540     4540 4540 4540   4540 4540 
Sargan Test (p-value) 0,270     0,265 0,291 0,273   0,268 0,271 
AR (1) and p-value -3,0a (0,00)  -2,8a (0,00) -2,9a (0,00) -2,8a (0,00)   -2,0b (0,04)  -2,0b (0,04) 
AR (2) and p-value -0,4  (0,77)   0,4 (0,79) -1,2  (0,25) -0,6  (0,61)   -1,1  (0,29)  -1,0  (0,26) 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 7: Determinants of Banks’ Risk: Dynamic Panel Analysis (cont.) 
Panel D: Subsamples and Time Fixed Effects 
This table reports the estimation results of four regressions based on equation (4), for subsamples with time fixed 
effects. We use the Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano e Bond, 1991) and GMM procedure. The dependent variable 
RISK is the ratio of provisions for loan losses and the total net loans and is used as a proxy of the bank’s credit risk. 
This variable appears transformed (dependent variable ln(RISKit/(1-RISKit)). GDP is the real GDP growth; DFAM 
is the ratio between the liabilities of families and the GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities of firms and 
GDP; LOAN_TO_ASSETS is the ratio of total loans to total assets; INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross 
income; SIZE is the ratio between bank assets i and the total bank assets; MARGIN is the proxy for bank 
profitability measured by net interest margin (gross margin); EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total 
assets; PREM is obtained from the difference between interest income over total assets and the interbank interest 
rate; RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of 
growth in real terms of the domestic residential housing market prices. 
Regression VII includes the banks of Germany and Austria. Regression VIII includes de banks of Spain, Ireland and 
UK. Regressions IX and X are estimated for the first quartile and fourth quartile, according to the weight of 
residential mortgage loans in total loans, respectively. t statistics are presented in brackets. a, b and c denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Variables XVII XVIII         XIX XX 
RISKit-1 0,0382
b 
(2,35) 
0,2002a 
(8,33) 
0,1481b 
(2,27) 
0,3947a 
(16,30) 
GDPt -0,0363
c 
(-1,87) 
-0,1561a 
(-2,78) 
-0,0469a 
(-2,63) 
-0,0212b 
(-2,54) 
GDPt-1 -0,0382
b 
(-2,47) 
-0,0042 
(-0,28) 
-0,0576a 
(-3,03) 
-0,0067 
(-0,84) 
DFAMt 0,0180
a 
(3,56) 
0,0098b 
(2,42) 
0,0131c 
(1,89) 
0,0045b 
(2,10) 
DEMPt -0,0015
 
(-0,55) 
-0,0003 
(-0,27) 
-0,0006 
(-0,60) 
-0,0011c 
(-1,77) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-1 0,2559
c 
(1,70) 
0,8617a 
(4,44) 
0,4921c 
(1,97) 
0,5146a 
(3,54) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-2 -0,2329
c 
(-1,69) 
0,0513 
(0,32) 
-0,1375 
(-0,87) 
0,1755 
(0,93) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-3 -0,0506 
(-0,32) 
0,0314 
(0,14) 
0,0425 
(0,16) 
0,3257c 
(1,72) 
INEFit 0,0023
a 
(3,63) 
0,0002 
(0,24) 
0,0011 
(1,56) 
0,0031b 
(2,30) 
SIZEit -7,9962
a 
(-4,69) 
-3,1020b 
(-2,02) 
-4,8550c 
(-1,68) 
-8,3614c 
(-1,67) 
MARGINit-2 0,0007
 
(1,54) 
0,0700b 
(2,23) 
0,0013c 
(1,67) 
0,0458 
(1,31) 
MARGINit-3 -0,0011
 
(-1,48) 
0,0647a 
(3,05) 
-0,0031 
(-1,36) 
-0,0068 
(-0,18) 
EQUITYit-2 0,8039
c 
(1,98) 
0,4614 
(0,59) 
0,2544 
(0,57) 
-0,7931 
(-1,55) 
EQUITYit-3 -0,6370
a 
(-2,94) 
-1,1641 
(-1,57) 
0,2221 
(0,52) 
-0,8719 
(-1,52) 
PREMit-3 0,0078
c 
(1,77) 
-0,0045 
(-0,34) 
0,0249c 
(1,86) 
0,0129 
(1,26) 
RMSHAREit -9,7012
a 
(-3,35) 
3,0927b 
(2,11) 
-15,4566a 
(-2,59) 
0,7686 
(0,45) 
RMSHAREit * RPPRICEt-1 0,0309
c 
(1,84) 
-0,0120a 
(-3,78) 
-0,0385b 
(-2,03) 
-0,0041b 
(-2,04) 
Time Period 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 
# Observations 688 1273 1011 1081 
Sargan Test (p-value) 0,185 0,144 0,370 0,188 
AR (1) and p-value   -5,0a  (0,00)  -2,6a   (0,00)  -2,8a  (0,00)  -3,3a (0,00) 
AR (2) and p-value   -0,3   (0,74)   0,2    (0,81)   0,3   (0,73)  -0,2   (0,83) 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 8: Profitability Determinants: Dynamic Panel Analysis 
Panel A: Linear Regressions 
This table reports the estimation results of 5 regressions on the profitability of banks based on equation (5). We use 
the Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano e Bond, 1991) and GMM procedure. The dependent variable MARGIN is 
measured by net interest margin (gross margin) and is used as the proxy for bank profitability. GDP is the real GDP 
growth; BBMB is a dummy that takes the value 1 for banks that operate in financial systems based on the banking 
sector and the value 0 for systems based on the capital market. The dummy variable takes the value 0 to the 
Netherlands, UK, Finland, Denmark and Ireland and the value 1 for the remaining countries of the EU-15; RISK is 
the proxy of the bank’s credit risk and is measured by the ratio of provisions for loan losses and the total net loans; 
LIQ is the ratio of net loans  to short term funding; SDR3M is the annual standard deviation of the daily interbank at 
3 month interest rate; HH is the Herfindahl e Hirschman Index obtained via total assets on the domestic market (the 
ratio was obtained from the ECB and range between 0 and 10.000); INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross 
income; ΔLOAN is the loans growth rate; EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; IPP is the ratio 
non-interest expenses – non-interest revenues)/total assets; RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage loans in 
the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of the domestic residential housing market prices 
(or region, in the case of regression  III, for banks with regional or international exposure to the housing market). In 
the case of regressions IV and V, RPPRICE is the accumulated growth rate of real market prices of residential housing 
in the country (or region, in the case of regression V, for banks with regional or international exposure to the housing 
market). t statistics are presented in brackets. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Variables          I         II        III        IV        V 
MARGINit-1 5,805a   (19,65) 5,802a  (19,53) 5,807a  (29,64) 5,809a  (31,16) 5,808a  (31,02) 
GDPt 0,134a    (4,78) 0,142a   (5,00) 0,135a   (4,79) 0,132a   (4,67) 0,132a   (4,66) 
GDPt-1 0,035     (1,24) 0,030    (1,06) 0,037     (1,27) 0,044    (1,50) 0,043    (1,49) 
BBMBt 0,399a    (9,81) 0,389a   (9,63) 0,402a    (9,64) 0,363a   (9,08) 0,363a   (9,06) 
RISKit-2 0,483a   (12,57) 0,482a  (12,40) 0,484a  (12,62) 0,484a  (13,11) 0,484a  (13,07) 
RISKit-3 0,793a   (14,05) 0,792a  (13,84) 0,794a  (14,12) 0,796a  (14,74) 0,795a  (14,69) 
LIQit-1 0,117b     (2,46) 0,123b   (2,46) 0,001b  (2,46) 0,001b  (2,27) 0,001b  (2,29) 
LIQit-2 0,028      (0,58) 0,067    (1,21) 0,000    (0,65) 0,000    (0,82) 0,000    (0,81) 
SDR3M it-1 0,207a        (3,10) 0,197a     (2,96) 0,208a     (3,11) 0,212a     (3,18) 0,213a     (3,18) 
SDR3M it-2 0,360a     (4,34) 0,331a   (3,99) 0,364a   (4,33) 0,323a   (3,94) 0,325a   (3,96) 
HHt -0,042    (-1,05) -0,043  (-1,06) 0,000    (0,16) 0,000    (0,51) 0,000   (0,47) 
INEFit -0,005c   (-1,95) -0,005  (-2,04) -0,005b (-1,96) -0,004c (-1,91) -0,004c (-1,91) 
ΔLOAN it -0,010a   (-7,50) -0,010a (-7,24) -0,011a (-7,47) -0,011a (-7,57) -0,011a (-7,55) 
EQUITYit-2 9,891a     (2,86) 10,011a  (2,88) 9,839a  (2,86) 9,700a  (2,83) 9,700a  (2,83) 
EQUITYit-3 -0,882    (-0,29) -0,823  (-0,27) -0,925  (-0,31) -0,658  (-0,22) -0,639  (-0,22) 
IPPit 4,374c    (1,66) 4,448c    (1,66) 4,360   (1,23) 4,146   (1,23) 4,165  (1,23) 
RMSHAREit 1,904c    (1,83) 2,104b   (2,01) 1,878c  (1,82) 2,053b   (1,99) 2,078b (2,01) 
RMSHAREit*RPPRICEt-1  -0,024a (-3,61) 0,005   (0,49) -0,025a (-5,06) -0,028a (-4,86) 
Time Period  2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008 
# Observations       3555 3555 3555 3555 3555 
Sargan Test (p-value)       0,179 0,145 0,130 0,149 0,158 
AR (1) and p-value   -4,5a      (0,00)  -3,8a     (0,01)  -3,3a      (0,00)  -3,6a     (0,00)  -4,0a      (0,00) 
AR (2) and p-value   -0,5       (0,38)   -0,2    (0,82)   -0,5    (0,22)   0,1      (0,78)  -0,3       (0,55) 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects No No No No No 
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Table 8: Profitability Determinants: Dynamic Panel Analysis: Subsamples (cont.) 
Panel B: Quadratic Regressions 
This table reports the estimation results of 4 regressions on the profitability of banks based on equation (6). We use 
the Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano e Bond, 1991) and GMM procedure. The dependent variable MARGIN is 
measured by net interest margin (gross margin) and is used as the proxy for bank profitability. GDP is the real GDP 
growth; BBMB is a dummy that takes the value 1 for banks that operate in financial systems based on the banking 
sector and the value 0 for systems based on the capital market. The dummy variable takes the value 0 to the 
Netherlands, UK, Finland, Denmark and Ireland and the value 1 for the remaining countries of the EU-15; RISK is 
the proxy of the bank’s credit risk and is measured by the ratio of provisions for loan losses and the total net loans; 
LIQ is the ratio of net loans  to short term funding; SDR3M is the annual standard deviation of the daily interbank at 
3 month interest rate; HH is the Herfindahl e Hirschman Index obtained via total assets on the domestic market (the 
ratio was obtained from the ECB and range between 0 and 10.000); INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross 
income; ΔLOAN is the loans growth rate; EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; IPP is the ratio 
non-interest expenses – non-interest revenues)/total assets; RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage loans in 
the total bank assets; LTV is the average loan to value ratio, by country. Regressions VI and VII include all the banks. 
Regressions VIII and IX are estimated for the first quartile and fourth quartile, according to the weight of residential 
mortgage loans in total loans, respectively. t statistics are presented in brackets. a, b and c denote statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Variables VI VII        VIII IX 
MARGINit-1 4,575a      (8,75) 5,220a     (13,70) 1,102a      (12,99) 0,811a      (22,46) 
GDPt 0,071a      (2,91) 0,122a     (4,71) 0,078b      (2,59) 0,026a     (4,83) 
GDPt-1 0,034c      (1,66) 0,099a      (3,92) 0,093b      (2,27) -0,004      (-0,47) 
BBMBt 0,296a      (6,44) 0,137b      (2,41) -0,005      (0,11) -0,036a      (-2,93) 
RISKit-2 16,643c    (1,71) 7,727c      (1,86) -0,462      (-0,23) -2,277      (-0,33) 
RISKit-3 -9,557a      (-2,66) -3,434      (-0,60) 2,879b      (2,05) 4,871a     (-4,28) 
LIQit-1 0,197b      (2,16) 0,160a       (3,49) 0,095c       (1,69) 0,003      (0,21) 
LIQit-2 -0,001     (-0,07) -0,020      (-0,48) 0,035       (0,25) -0,007      (-1,61) 
SDR3M it-1 0,223a           (3,89) 0,224a              (3,79) -0,034      (-0,24) 0,081a           (5,72) 
SDR3M it-2 0,244a     (3,83) 0,294a       (4,11) -0,093      (-0,45) 0,233a      (9,10) 
HHt -0,172a     (-3,33) -0,120b     (-2,54) -0,114b     (-2,33) 0,004       (0,33) 
INEFit -0,009a   (-2,94) -0,008a     (-3,21) -0,019a    (-4,46) -0,005a   (-4,57) 
ΔLOAN it -0,051a   (-4,15) -0,042a     (-2,77) -0,007     (-0,50) -0,155b   (-2,57) 
EQUITYit-2 10,634a   (3,11) 8,716a      (2,78) -1,551     (-1,00) -0,431     (-0,66) 
EQUITYit-3 0,894      (0,25) 1,817       (0,51) -4,117b    (-2,03) 0,674c     (1,72) 
IPPit 22,915b    (2,36) 16,089b    (2,39) 88,942a    (4,71) 0,161a    (6,17) 
RMSHAREit 3,266b      (2,27) 4,937a      (3,06) 2,341c      (1,68) 1,074a     (5,49) 
RMSHAREit* RISKit-1 -228,108a    (-2,76) -243,904a    (-3,00) -570,271a    (-4,41) -14,775c   (-1,70) 
RMSHAREit* (RISKit-1)2 2921,803a   (3,57) 2459,394a     (3,23) 1894,734c    (1,72) 1058,387b  (2,37) 
LTVt  0,563a       (7,56)   
Time Period 2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008 
# Observations 3554 3554 637 644 
Sargan Test (p-value) 0,175 0,157 0,126 0,111 
AR (1) and p-value   -4,8a          (0,00)  -3,6a         (0,01)  -3,9a        (0,00)  -5,2a         (0,00) 
AR (2) and p-value     0,2           (0,88)   -0,6         (0,26)   -0,3        (0,62)   0,3          (0,58) 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects No No No No 
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Table 8: Profitability Determinants: Dynamic Panel Analysis (cont.) 
Panel C: Linear Regressions and Time Fixed Effects 
This table reports the estimation results of 5 regressions on the profitability of banks based on equation (5) with time 
fixed effects. We use the Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano e Bond, 1991) and GMM procedure. The dependent 
variable MARGIN is measured by net interest margin (gross margin) and is used as the proxy for bank profitability. 
GDP is the real GDP growth; BBMB is a dummy that takes the value 1 for banks that operate in financial systems 
based on the banking sector and the value 0 for systems based on the capital market. The dummy variable takes the 
value 0 to the Netherlands, UK, Finland, Denmark and Ireland and the value 1 for the remaining countries of the EU-
15; RISK is the proxy of the bank’s credit risk and is measured by the ratio of provisions for loan losses and the total 
net loans; LIQ is the ratio of net loans  to short term funding; SDR3M is the annual standard deviation of the daily 
interbank at 3 month interest rate; HH is the Herfindahl e Hirschman Index obtained via total assets on the domestic 
market (the ratio was obtained from the ECB and range between 0 and 10.000); INEF is the ratio of operating costs 
to gross income; ΔLOAN is the loans growth rate; EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; IPP is 
the ratio non-interest expenses – non-interest revenues)/total assets; RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage 
loans in the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of the domestic residential housing market 
prices (or region, in the case of regression  III, for banks with regional or international exposure to the housing 
market). In the case of regressions IV and V, RPPRICE is the accumulated growth rate of real market prices of 
residential housing in the country (or region, in the case of regression V, for banks with regional or international 
exposure to the housing market). t statistics are presented in brackets. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively.  
Variables         X         XI        XII        XIII        XIV 
MARGINit-1 5,921a   (42,69) 5,935a   (40,05) 5,924a  (42,69) 5,918a  (41,53) 5,918a  (41,45) 
GDPt 0,080c    (1,75) 0,066a    (2,71) 0,079c   (1,73) 0,084c   (1,84) 0,085c   (1,84) 
GDPt-1 -0,014   (-0,28) -0,017   (-0,26) -0,015   (-0,28) -0,008   (-0,15) -0,007   (-0,14) 
BBMBt 0,105c    (1,97) 0,122c    (1,81) 0,107c    (1,98) 0,150c   (1,83) 0,147c   (1,90) 
RISKit-2 0,495a   (15,93) 0,499a   (16,67) 0,494a  (16,11) 0,491a  (15,66) 0,491a  (15,65) 
RISKit-3 0,832a   (19,52) 0,839a   (20,88) 0,833a  (19,68) 0,829a  (19,08) 0,829a  (19,06) 
LIQit-1 0,013a     (3,20) 0,014b     (2,55) 0,013a  (3,00) 0,013a   (3,18) 0,013a  (3,17) 
LIQit-2 0,011a     (2,61) 0,011a     (2,65) 0,012a   (2,71) 0,012a  (2,98) 0,012a  (2,97) 
SDR3M it-1 0,185c        (1,72) 0,190b        (2,01) 0,108c     (1,73) 0,103c    (1,69) 0,103c     (1,70) 
SDR3M it-2 0,181c     (1,92) 0,156c     (1,65) 0,212b   (2,20) 0,209b  (2,19) 0,208b   (2,19) 
HHt -0,001    (-1,14) -0,001    (-1,32) -0,001   (-1,28) -0,001  (-1,22) -0,001  (-1,21) 
INEFit -0,005b   (-2,12) -0,005b  (-2,22) -0,005b (-2,10) -0,005b (-2,07) -0,005b (-2,07) 
ΔLOAN it -0,011a   (-5,11) -0,010a   (-5,48) -0,011a (-5,23) -0,011a (-5,00) -0,011a (-4,99) 
EQUITYit-2 7,138b    (2,15) 7,810b     (2,27) 7,164b  (2,16) 7,019b  (-2,12) 6,993b  (2,12) 
EQUITYit-3 1,922    (0,63) 1,772    (0,56) 1,938  (0,64) 1,780  (0,58) 1,796  (0,59) 
IPPit 2,544c    (1,77) 2,062c    (1,84) 2,473   (1,05) 2,648   (1,09) 2,650  (1,09) 
RMSHAREit 0,696    (0,66) 0,842    (0,78) 1,005  (0,93) 0,961   (0,89) 0,976 (0,91) 
RMSHAREit*RPPRICEt-1  -0,023b (-2,32) -0,029b  (-2,42) -0,017b (-2,27) -0,016b (-2,22) 
Time Period  2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008 
# Observations       3555 3555 3555 3555 3555 
Sargan Test (p-value)       0,179 0,169 0,130 0,126 0,158 
AR (1) and p-value   -4,7a      (0,00)  -3,9a     (0,00)  -3,3a      (0,00)  -3,4a     (0,00)  -3,9a      (0,00) 
AR (2) and p-value   -0,5       (0,29)   -0,3    (0,73)   -0,5    (0,22)   0,2     (0,66)  -0,2      (0,60) 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 8: Profitability Determinants: Dynamic Panel Analysis: Subsamples (cont.) 
Panel D: Quadratic Regressions and Time Fixed Effects 
This table reports the estimation results of 4 regressions on the profitability of banks based on equation (6) with time 
fixed effects. We use the Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano e Bond, 1991) and GMM procedure. The dependent 
variable MARGIN is measured by net interest margin (gross margin) and is used as the proxy for bank profitability. 
GDP is the real GDP growth; BBMB is a dummy that takes the value 1 for banks that operate in financial systems 
based on the banking sector and the value 0 for systems based on the capital market. The dummy variable takes the 
value 0 to the Netherlands, UK, Finland, Denmark and Ireland and the value 1 for the remaining countries of the EU-
15; RISK is the proxy of the bank’s credit risk and is measured by the ratio of provisions for loan losses and the total 
net loans; LIQ is the ratio of net loans  to short term funding; SDR3M is the annual standard deviation of the daily 
interbank at 3 month interest rate; HH is the Herfindahl e Hirschman Index obtained via total assets on the domestic 
market (the ratio was obtained from the ECB and range between 0 and 10.000); INEF is the ratio of operating costs 
to gross income; ΔLOAN is the loans growth rate; EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; IPP is 
the ratio non-interest expenses – non-interest revenues)/total assets; RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage 
loans in the total bank assets; LTV is the average loan to value ratio, by country. Regressions VI and VII include all 
the banks. Regressions VIII and IX are estimated for the first quartile and fourth quartile, according to the weight of 
residential mortgage loans in total loans, respectively. t statistics are presented in brackets. a, b and c denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Variables XV XVI        XVII XVIII 
MARGINit-1 5,525a     (19,44) 5,514a     (22,32) 1,092a      (12,46) 0,744a    (13,93) 
GDPt 0,069c      (1,68) 0,078c     (1,85) 0,078b     (2,47) 0,038b     (2,44) 
GDPt-1 -0,062     (-1,20) 0,026      (0,53) 0,075      (1,38) 0,041a     (3,22) 
BBMBt 0,157b      (2,52) 0,156b      (2,52) 0,007      (0,10) -0,042a     (-2,99) 
RISKit-2 4,214c     (1,70) 10,168c    (1,99) -0,542      (-0,31) -4,910     (-0,80) 
RISKit-3 -7,164     (-1,22) -5,189     (-0,98) -2,893b     (-2,18) -5,509a     (-5,09) 
LIQit-1 0,183a      (3,41) 0,161a      (3,30) 0,086b      (2,34) 0,012      (0,84) 
LIQit-2     0,071      (1,45) 0,056      (1,01) 0,032       (0,23) 0,014b     (2,18) 
SDR3M it-1  0,125c        (1,86) 0,118c          (1,79) 0,022      (0,12) 0,092a           (5,78) 
SDR3M it-2 0,192b     (2,10) 0,204b      (2,22) 0,112      (0,29) 0,239a      (7,46) 
HHt  -0,096c    (1,79) -0,125b     (-2,43) -0,101c     (-1,78) 0,010       (0,86) 
INEFit -0,007a   (-2,85) -0,008a     (-3,12) -0,025a    (-5,69) -0,004a   (-3,70) 
ΔLOAN it -0,030b   (-2,15) -0,035a     (-2,91) 0,001     (0,10) -0,135b   (-2,59) 
EQUITYit-2 6,222b   (2,12) 7,619b      (2,50) -1,608     (-0,86) -1,385c    (-1,69) 
EQUITYit-3 0,959      (0,24) 1,607      (0,43) -3,876b    (-2,02) 1,489b     (2,40) 
IPPit 9,667b    (2,01) 10,790b    (2,57) 89,093a    (4,49) 0,182a    (7,08) 
RMSHAREit 3,084c      (1,85) 3,879b      (2,26) 2,405c      (1,72) 1,034a     (5,94) 
RMSHAREit* RISKit-1 -182,122a    (-2,74) -213,578a    (-2,93) -566,589a    (-4,55) -32,482a   (-3,05) 
RMSHAREit* (RISKit-1)2 1582,752c   (1,89) 1982,967b    (2,56) 1464,371c    (1,68) 1669,768a  (3,83) 
LTVt  0,531a       (5,60)   
Time Period 2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008 
# Observations 3554 3554 637 644 
Sargan Test (p-value) 0,166 0,171 0,119 0,133 
AR (1) and p-value   -4,2a          (0,00)  -3,9a         (0,00)  -3,7a        (0,00)  -5,4a         (0,00) 
AR (2) and p-value     0,4           (0,48)   -0,4         (0,51)   -0,3        (0,59)   0,6         (0,24) 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 9: Effects of Residential Mortgage Loans on Bank’s Risk Adjusted 
Profitability  
 
 Banks with Moderate Credit Risk  Banks with High Credit Risk 
Effects of the Increase in 
the Weight of Residential 
Mortgage Loans on Asset 
Bank’s 
- Decrease of Credit Risk 
- Profitability Unaffected or Marginal 
Decrease 
 
Increased Performance OR Effect 
on Performance Ambiguous 
- Decrease of Credit Risk 
- Profitability Increase 
  
 
Increased Performance 
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Figure 1: The financing of residential mortgage loans in the EU (2009) 
 
Source: European Mortgage Federation (EMF) (www.hypo.org) 
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Figure 2: Disaster Myopia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Herring and Wachter (1999) 
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